

Traditional and Innovative Approaches to Legal Reform: The ‘New Company Law’

Joseph A. McCahery,* Erik P.M. Vermeulen,** Masato Hisatake***
and Jun Saito****

1.	Introduction.....	8
2.	The production of ‘new company law’: three reform strategies	13
2.1	The first strategy: ‘patching-up’ revisions	14
2.1.1	Elites and traditions in company law	15
2.1.2	Increasing returns.....	18
2.1.3	<i>GmbH</i> reform: an example of ‘patching-up’ provisions	22
2.2	The second strategy: responding to reform-minded interest group pressures	25
2.3	The third strategy: responding to exogenous pressures	35
3.	New product selection	43
3.1	The rise of ‘new company law’ products.....	43
3.2	Inherent benefits of new statutory products.....	45
3.2.1	Limited liability and pass-through taxation	45
3.2.2	Limited liability and private ordering	51
4.	Conclusion.....	56

Abstract

Lower barriers of entry for new firms and more flexibility in structuring a business organisation are the two key factors motivating the introduction of the new company law. In general, policymakers use new company law initiatives to

* Professor of Corporate Governance and Innovation, University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics and Econometrics; Professor of Financial Market Regulation, Tilburg Law and Economics Center; Research Associate, ECGI (Brussels). Research support was received from the Business Register Interoperability Throughout Europe (BRITE) project, under European Commission contract number 027190, and the Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs.

** Professor of Financial Market Regulation, Tilburg Law and Economics Center; Professor of Law and Management, Tilburg University Faculty of Law; Senior Legal Counsel at Philips International B.V.

*** Director, Economic Analysis Office, Economic and Industry Policy Bureau, METI; Consulting Fellow, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI), Japan.

**** Executive Staff, Corporate Technology Management, Nikon Corporation, Japan.

encourage entrepreneurship, innovation and cooperative arrangements. This paper distinguishes the diverse strands of company law reforms arising in the United States, Europe and Asia and points to the underlying conditions that shape the markedly different reform outputs. Our analysis points to three important factors – (1) private ordering; (2) fiscal transparency; and (3) limited liability – that influence the incentives for new firm creation. However, we find that many of the new company law reforms are incomplete. Nevertheless, these new company law reforms retain the ability to generate rents due to their adaptability and responsiveness to social and economic change.

Keywords: new company law, innovation, contracts, incomplete law.

1. INTRODUCTION

Ideally, new company law vehicles are the result of legislative processes that are initiated for the most part to create mechanisms designed to reduce agency costs and satisfy the contracting interests of business parties, such as investors, firm founders and joint venture partners.¹ The voluminous literature on law and society explains that lawmakers are public-regarding actors who will identify which rules are efficient across different firms and time and replace inefficient rules accordingly. Thus conceived, the ideal and actual function of law-making is to attempt to increase social welfare by correcting market failures. Lawmakers supposedly regulate company forms in the public interest.²

Criticism of this public interest theory of law-making has largely focused on two shortcomings. First, legislation is not primarily the result of efficiency considerations. Second, despite similar external market pressures, differences in company law forms continue to persist. Even though there have been recent instances of formal legal convergence, current law-making procedures and pre-existing conditions tend to lock the evolution of company law structures into a particular path, thereby maintaining diversity between individual jurisdictions.³

¹ See R. Kraakman, P. Davies, H. Hansmann, G. Hertig, K. Hopt, H. Kanda and E. Rock, eds., *The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach* (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2004).

² This view corresponds to the 'public interest theory'. The public interest paradigm of law-making emphasises the government's role in correcting market imperfections such as monopoly pricing and pollution. See J.-J. Laffont and J. Tirole, *A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation* (Cambridge, MIT Press 1993) p. 475.

³ R. Gilson, 'Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function', 49 *American Journal of Comparative Law* (2001) pp. 329-358 (distinguishing between functional convergence (when existing institutions are flexible enough to respond to the demands of changed circumstances without altering institutions' formal characteristics) and formal convergence resulting in legislative action necessary to alter the existing institutions).

At the other end of the spectrum is the view that competitive pressures induce lawmakers to adopt the company law rules that are value-increasing. Under these circumstances, lawmakers, eager to please investors and other businesses parties, identify practices seen as enhancing firms' economic performance and introduce company law reforms that have the potential to be more cost-effective and are suitably adapted to firms' changing business needs. Firms and their internal participants are viewed as consumers in a market for company law, in which lawmakers seek to design a predictable legal product that reduces firms' costs.⁴

Consequently, as national boundaries are of diminishing significance, the cross-fertilisation of legal concepts is not so much a choice as a necessity. In many countries, there is a revival of interest in company law reform projects and the introduction of new hybrid governance structures that presumptively could lead to formal convergence, as reform projects spread around the world through a combination of outright borrowing and more subtle imitation. Due largely to the worldwide development of the Internet, it is relatively easy for lawmakers to take notice of foreign legal business forms that have already been tried and tested in a legal system with similar business, social and political dimensions. If we take this a step further, the drive towards new company law at all business levels could eventually lead to more efficiency, as countries adopt rules and institutions representing the best possible outcome. This theory is based on the premise that unless a country's lawmakers consider foreign legislative approaches and solutions, the domestic economy will fall behind its competitors.

Indeed, as the influence of 'legal transplants' from the United States is felt more and more in company law reform projects in both Europe and Asia, it might be expected that non-US jurisdictions will eventually display similar patterns of legal evolution as we currently see in the United States. For instance, the last decade has witnessed the rise of new legal entities and US transplants in countries that represent both common law and civil law traditions. In the United Kingdom, the promulgation of the limited liability partnership (LLP) was prompted by competition from offshore LLP statutes, particularly that of Jersey, where Price Waterhouse and Ernst & Young promoted the new legislation based on a similar law enacted in the State of Delaware. The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), which was directly involved in the introduction of the LLP in the United Kingdom, did not, however, just adopt the US LLP – which simply added the limited liability feature to its general partnership law provisions. Ultimately, the DTI created a stand-alone, hybrid company form that is situated between a partnership and a corporation.

Similarly, a Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2005, inspired by the Delaware LLP, came into effect on 11 April 2005 in Singapore. The Company Legislation and Regulatory Framework Committee (CLRFC) spurred the introduction of an

⁴ R. Romano, *The Genius of American Corporate Law* (Washington, AEI Press 1993).

LLP in Singapore in order to expand the governance options to be considered by small and medium-sized businesses, professionals and investment funds. Importantly, Japan, which has a tradition of following Germany's company law model, has recently been inspired by the success of legal innovation in the United States and the United Kingdom, resulting in the introduction of two new legal forms: the LLP (*Yugen Sekinin Jigyo Kumiai*) and the LLC (*Godo Kaisha*). These hybrid entities, which are intended to supply Japanese firms with more contractual flexibility, are arguably more suitable for firms involved in multinational joint ventures in the human capital intensive and financial services sectors.

As politicians and business groups across Asia reflect on the changes in Japanese company law, which are seen as offering organisational advantages to firms in knowledge intensive industries, lawmakers in other Asian competitive countries, such as India and China, are already sequencing reforms that will lead to the introduction of the LLP. To the extent that India, for example, is a late-comer in adopting LLP legislation, the delay seems to have provided opportunities for lawmakers to learn from the tried and tested experiences in other jurisdictions. Efforts to improve on the LLP structure, based on learning outcomes in other countries, may well benefit Indian professional firms, which are increasingly involved in international transactions, by giving them a business form that is adaptive to their competitive and litigious environment. The reform is seen as desirable, moreover, as it can help induce the introduction of more business start-ups. Similar arguments are used to the same effect by the Chinese Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, which already adopted major revisions to China's company law on 27 October 2005, including the introduction of one-person companies, lower capital requirements,⁵ improved information rights and other corporate governance techniques. This laid the basis for China's top legislature to open the discussion, in April 2006, on introducing LLPs in order to stimulate venture capital investment and create a level-playing field to facilitate a competitive advantage for Chinese professional firms that increasingly operate in the global market. Importantly, the type of reforms proposed in Asia point to significant inherent benefits in terms of increased flexibility for the firms that adopt new hybrid legal forms. As they are cheaply available and combine the best of the partnership and corporate world, these flexible legal forms contain features that make them better suited to professional firms, start-ups, small family firms and financial funds.

These developments suggest that there may be significant benefits for businesses and investors in jurisdictions that make available more productive business forms. Why, then, do we not see a proliferation of new hybrid business forms in

⁵ For limited liability companies, the minimum capital has been decreased from RMB 100,000 to RMB 30,000 (approximately US\$3,750). A one-person company could be set up with a minimum capital of approximately US\$12,500.

continental Europe? After all, the European Court of Justice's judgments in *Centros*, *Überseering* and *Inspire Art* only recently set in train the basis for the cross-border movement of administrative headquarters and the migration of new firms to more favourable jurisdictions. The ECJ's case law has improved corporate mobility dramatically as a large number of continental European privately held firms have been influenced, by the absence of minimum capital requirements, to incorporate in the United Kingdom as limited companies.⁶ We have to keep in mind, however, that those European firms incorporating in the United Kingdom are mostly 'round-trippers', which means that a large percentage of businesses in continental Europe could benefit directly from the development of more efficient hybrid entities in their own jurisdiction. But, they need a coalition of groups to crack open the policy-making agenda and induce national legislatures to introduce new limited liability vehicles. These reasons may be enough to explain the fact that the impact of the ECJ's decisions has only led to patching-up initiatives in most Member States, influencing some legislatures to eliminate or reduce minimum capital for private companies. As a consequence, the demand for upgraded company law unhindered by capital maintenance requirements is relatively high across the European Union, while the introduction of new hybrid business forms is mainly viewed as unnecessary since they contribute to increased costs attributed mainly to transition issues and enhanced choice.⁷

As we will see in section 2 of this paper, there are three main implications for a theory of legal evolution that significantly shape the landscape of and influence the debate on company law reforms. First, the predominance of particular legal elites or traditions in the field of company law restricts the evolution of the law rather than enhancing its development.⁸ Second, the standardisation of legal business forms confers large increasing returns benefits to the users and their legal advisers, arguably limiting the development of modern innovative business forms. Most legal advisers tend to rely on standard legal rules, which reduce costs as most parties are familiar with them, irrespective of the cumbersome and inefficient nature of many of the standard statutory provisions. Proponents of traditional rules argue that, even if a firm has additional incentives to use an innovative legal form, they are generally unlikely to select the vehicle, despite its

⁶ See M. Becht, C. Mayer and H. Wagner, *Corporate Mobility, Entrepreneurship, Financial Regulation, Regulatory Competition*, ECGI Law Working Paper No. 70 (2006), available at: <<http://www.econ.upf.edu/docs/seminars/mayer.pdf>>.

⁷ J. Freedman, 'The Quest for an Ideal Form for Small Businesses – A Misconceived Enterprise?', in B.A.K. Rider and M. Andenas, eds., *Developments in European Company Law*, Vol. 2/1997: *The Quest for an Ideal Legal Form for Small Businesses* (London, Kluwer Law International 1999) pp. 5-34.

⁸ R.C. Clark, 'Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law', 89 *Columbia Law Review* (1989) pp. 1703-1747 (distinguishing among three approaches to law-making: (1) contractual rule-making; (2) elite rule-making; and (3) traditional rule-making).

potential, due to the lack of certainty about its legal provisions. Third, start-up and smaller firms have considerable financial and organisational constraints that do not allow them to influence the legislature to adopt business form statutes that match their needs. Even if the existing menu of business forms imposes considerable costs on firms that are required to either comply with highly formalistic and technical regulations or contract around obsolete provisions, these firms are usually not able to run up against the presence of concentrated interest groups defending the *status quo*. Hence, even if incentives to overhaul company law are clearly present, the reform process is reinforced by sources of path dependence that inhibit the evolution of innovative legal business forms.

Nevertheless, if we compare and weigh up the competing interests on the supply and demand sides of legislation, we cannot predict with certitude the effects of path dependence on legal change in a particular jurisdiction. The outcome will depend largely on the effect that each interest has on the evolutionary process. If certain pressures are not present in a jurisdiction, or are mitigated by unspecified reactions and forces, the influence of path dependence factors on business forms is likely to be commensurately weaker. The application of the idea of path dependence to law shows that legal institutions evolve along a historical path and can therefore become locked-in and resistant to change. In turn, this inflexibility often leads to inefficiencies, as legal rules fail to respond to changes in the underlying social and economic conditions.

That is not to say that new hybrid business forms provide efficient and all-encompassing governance frameworks and solutions, but they arguably can play a pivotal role in transaction planning and cooperative bargaining among business participants. Opponents to new legal forms attempt to frustrate and ridicule the need for new company law. One common view is that a firm can tinker with the existing legal framework by simply adjusting the statutory provisions or combining existing legal forms to create a structure that is responsive to its needs. The balance of evidence suggests, however, that substantially modifying the company law statutes involves significant costs (e.g., increased information costs and uncertainty, distortions in the signalling function of business forms, decreased coherence of terms, erroneous gap-filling by courts and other negative spill-over effects) that outweigh possible benefits. In this paper, we show how new separate business statutes can be more efficient in providing firms, at different levels, with a legal structure that does not impose burdens or create distortions and, hence, would have significant cost advantages.⁹

⁹ Our emphasis here is the content of the new legislation and not the frictions created by transition costs. Many argue that transition costs (i.e., learning and uncertainty costs) will hamper the introduction and implementation of new business forms. However, this paper shows that lawmakers, by relying on default rules which are flexible and allow parties to opt out and bargain around stringent terms, are able to mitigate the worse effects of legal innovation, see M.P. Van Alstine, 'The Costs of Legal Change', 49 *UCLA Law Review* (2002) pp. 789-817.

Indeed, the introduction of new hybrid business forms indicates that contractual rule-making sometimes prevails over so-called elite and traditional rule-making.¹⁰ For this reason, we argue that devising new and separate company law forms is more efficient, as they offer distinct sets of rules and norms that a variety of businesses would have bargained for in a costless world. Moreover, a separate set of legal arrangements has substantial contracting benefits for the firm's participants by allowing them to define their expectations *ex ante* – less hindered by existing doctrines and traditions – and, hence, assist judiciaries in solving governance problems and other conflicts *ex post*. As a matter of fact, practicing lawyers and business advisors appear to be willing to embrace new company law, convinced that from both a tax and a business perspective hybrid business forms obtain the most efficient result. Section 3 provides empirical evidence for the popularity and effectiveness of new legal products in the United States, Europe and Asia. It seems that the selection of legal entities requires balancing limited liability protection against, on the one hand, tax benefits and, on the other hand, contractual freedom to organise and structure the firm. Empirical research from the United States confirms the importance of forms that combine limited liability with partnership-type taxation and flexibility. The recent developments in Asia suggest that lawmakers and academics cannot afford to remain in denial over the fact that the 'new company law' will eventually prevail over the existing partnership and corporate forms. Section 4 concludes.

2. THE PRODUCTION OF 'NEW COMPANY LAW': THREE REFORM STRATEGIES

This section introduces three law-making strategies that are often deployed by policymakers in company law reform projects (see Figure 1). The first strategy involves legislative and political processes that result in a mere updating of the existing company law statute. It is predicted that, in general, lawmakers are not likely to engage in innovative rule-making, but will supply only a superficial 'upgrade' in the existing legal product range. As this strategy is motivated by concerns to mimic results achieved by reforms to business forms in other competitive jurisdictions, as witnessed in continental Europe, these revisions are not likely to implicate the interests of the controlling elites and interest groups. A second strategy, involving the introduction of a new business form explicitly linked to the traditional company law framework, can lead to genuine change that will increase the overall quality of law for firms generally. As will be discussed, the difference between the first and second strategy is that the reforms yielded by the latter strategy may hold out potential costs savings for several classes of firms.

¹⁰ Clark, loc. cit. n. 8.

Finally, the third strategy is moved by exogenous and interest groups pressures with the effect of the promulgation of a new innovative legal statute. It is important to recognise that jurisdictions can use any combination of the above-referred strategies when considering reforms and that there may be additional incentives not mentioned above that motivate legislative outcomes.

Rather than making a strict distinction between the different reform strategies that could be used to explain the multiple paths of company law development, this section argues that reform measures undertaken by national level governments are best seen in terms of a spectrum of possible reform paths. It ranges from countries that belong to a strong legal tradition that curb deviations from the existing regime via countries with weakly organised centralised governments and strong organised pressure groups that break down the resistance to legislative change to competitive and entrepreneurial jurisdictions that attempt to offer an up-to-date legal product range. At one end of the spectrum, reformers find it difficult to make changes due to the high switching costs and institutional rules and political mechanisms that effectively define and control the items on the legislative reform agenda. At the other end of the spectrum, there is the presence of incentives to innovate, and the type of institutional infrastructure under which we can expect pressure groups to have agenda-setting powers may well explain the result of new company forms. Illustrations of recent national company law reforms allow us to see how the trajectory of trends tends to map on to the spectrum of legal reform.

Figure 1: The company law reform spectrum

strong path dependence		weak path dependence
- legal elites and traditions - increasing returns	- reform-minded interest groups	- responding lawmakers to exogenous pressures
first strategy	second strategy	third strategy

2.1 The first strategy: 'patching-up' revisions

The first strategy only leads to legal upgrades leaving the core of the company law system untouched. In this part, we seek to understand the variations in national legal rules and structures that are responsible for the persistence of inefficient company law rules and structures that policymakers cannot simply alter. It seems that the inferior outcome could largely be explained by strong path dependence factors, such as the influence of legal elites and traditions and the effect of increasing returns on the law-making process. Naturally, there are varying degrees of path dependence which are reflected in the diversity of recent company law developments. However, in terms of generalisation, strong path dependence is a common phenomenon in legal systems that are dominated by legal elites and traditions bereft of the 'law-as-a-product' dimension. Ironically, if

legal products – like regular products – gain popularity and expand utilisation, increasing returns can magnify the benefits of defending the *status quo*, resulting in a similar evolution pattern. This partly explains why European jurisdictions are still loath to overhaul their company laws even though the ECJ, as noted above, has opened the door towards a market for company law products. After a short discussion about what causes the strong path dependence, we will introduce factors that have proven to be effective in changing the company law reform path.

2.1.1 *Elites and traditions in company law*

In this subsection, we show how lawmakers traditionally shape and structure the company law reform process. It is submitted that legislators, judges, practitioners, regulatory agencies, professional groups and legal scholars constitute an elite law-making group that is responsible for interpreting, preserving and developing the law.¹¹ These legal professionals produce different kinds of texts, such as statutes, judicial decisions and scholarly writings, which one school of comparative law academics calls ‘legal formants’.¹² The law does not consist solely of these texts, but should instead be viewed as a series of formulations that complement each other.¹³ Still the law and its evolution appear more like a battleground on which law-making elites compete for hegemony than a system of checks and balances.¹⁴

What are the factors that tend to reinforce legal rules and institutions that are in place? Generally, there are two factors which operate to make law conservative. First, the law-making elite treats the law as existing in its own right. In this view, the law is largely autonomous and operates in its own sphere.¹⁵ As one commentator puts it: ‘the means of creating law, the sources of law, come to be regarded as a given, almost as something sacrosanct, and change in these even when they are obviously deeply flawed is extremely difficult to achieve.’¹⁶ Second, the law is justified in its own terms. Lawmakers, that is to say, persons trained in law and nothing else, search for the legitimacy of legal change, which makes the law typically backward-looking. To a large extent, this insulates legal

¹¹ A. Watson, *The Evolution of Law* (Oxford, Basil Blackwell 1985).

¹² The theory of legal formants, as suggested by Rodolfo Sacco, views the law as a social activity in which law-making elites compete to provide legal doctrines. See R. Sacco, ‘Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law’, 39 *American Journal of Comparative Law* (1991) pp. 1-34; P.G. Monateri and R. Sacco, ‘Legal Formants’, in P. Newman, ed., *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law*, Vol. 2 (London, Macmillan Reference Limited 1998) pp. 531-533.

¹³ R.B. Schlesinger, H.W. Baade, P.E. Herzog and E.M. Wise, *Comparative Law, Cases-Text-Materials* (New York, Foundation Press 1998).

¹⁴ P. Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field’, 38 *Hastings Law Journal* (1987) pp. 805-853 (Translator’s Introduction by R. Terdiman).

¹⁵ H. Kelsen, *Pure Theory of Law* (Berkeley, University of California Press 1967).

¹⁶ Watson, op. cit. n. 11.

evolution from social and economic change, and it therefore displays a serious degree of path dependence.

To what extent does the evolution of the legal rules and institutions reflect social and economic change? Lawmakers, who genuinely disagree as to which rules and institutions are 'best',¹⁷ could be viewed as legal elites that produce competing legal formants. It is possible to distinguish between conservative and reform-minded legal elites. Because the law is viewed as autonomous, lawmakers historically employ two strategies when entering the competitive arena of legal reform. On the one hand, conservative lawmakers deploy the existing legal doctrines, principles and culture to protect the *status quo* and thwart reform. On the other hand, reform-minded lawmakers traditionally make reference to foreign rules and institutions to propose legal change and to induce the controlling elite of the receiving system to believe that the offered model meets their expectations.¹⁸

If we take this a step further, it could be argued that the development of the law takes place mainly by transplantation of legal rules. Yet in order to be effective, a borrowed legal rule or institution must be understood and appreciated by the dominant, and usually conservative, law-making elite. Indeed, it is submitted that a legal transplant increases its own receptivity when adaptations to the domestic formal and informal legal order are made or the borrower is already familiar with basic legal principles of the donor jurisdiction.¹⁹

It is in the legal actors' nature to attach considerable importance to authority in the transplanting process. It is often very difficult for a law reformer to 'sell' his ideas without the support of some kind of authority whose expertise is widely recognised by the legal community.²⁰ That authority could be inherent in a foreign legal system or institution due to its prestige, common legal tradition or high accessibility. Reform-minded lawmakers attempt to convince the controlling elite that borrowing should occur by juxtaposing black-letter law reports and consulting intuition and any available facts to show the foreign legal system's supremacy.²¹ Yet, the results of comparative legal studies often lack a clear

¹⁷ L.A. Bebchuk and M.J. Roe, 'A Theory of Path Dependency in Corporate Ownership and Governance', 52 *Stanford Law Review* (1999) pp. 127-170.

¹⁸ A. Watson, *Legal Transplants, An Approach to Comparative Law* (Edinburgh, Scottish Academic Press 1974).

¹⁹ D. Berkowitz, K. Pistor and J-F. Richard, *Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect*, Working Paper (2001), available at: <<http://ssrn.com/abstract=183269>>.

²⁰ Sacco, loc. cit. n. 12 (arguing that a legal innovation that does not originate from an authority is often viewed as an 'error').

²¹ See A.I. Ogus, 'Law and Economics from the Perspective of Law', in Newman, op. cit. n. 12, at pp. 486-491. Prestige seems to be the key word. Sacco, loc. cit. n. 12, stating that as a consequence, 'it is unlikely that a European country will imitate an African model, that the United States will imitate a Venezuelan model, that the Scandinavian countries will imitate an Italian model, and so forth.' See also J.A. Fanto, *Persuasion and Resistance: The Use of Psychology by Anglo-American Corporate Governance Advocates in France*, Working Paper (7

theoretical or empirical explanation of why a particular foreign system or institution is the most suitable model, given the needs of the social and economic environment. When legal parochialism is strong and jurisdictions are largely resistant to transplants (which is often the case where jurisdictions are convinced of the effectiveness of their own legal system), reform-minded elites adopt a different strategy. They deny the fact that a model is borrowed and use local authority to bolster their opinion.²² In this view, legal change could be explained largely by ‘hidden’ transplants, which are a mixture of foreign and indigenous doctrines and principles.²³

However, it might be argued that if a jurisdiction becomes part of a common market like the United States or the European Union, convergence of important principles of company law is likely to become greater, as the number of firms that not only do business in more than one State, but have among their members residents of different States, increases. In this context, national level company law reforms in the European Union (EU) have been fostered by changes in the European Court of Justice’s case law, which have encouraged firm mobility for start-ups, giving reform-minded lawmakers an incentive to intensify their efforts to modernise their domestic company laws.²⁴ But, as noted earlier, the dominant reform strategy of most national level policymakers is still influenced by a ‘patching-up’ approach designed to ensure the prevalence of the *status quo*.²⁵

For instance, the elimination of the capital maintenance rules for private companies appears relatively easy. These rules, where the content is less important than their uniformity,²⁶ had already been applied to public corporations and were subsequently harmonised by the European Commission to reduce costs for third parties transacting with the firm.²⁷ Having served simply as an authoritative

May 2002), available at: <<http://ssrn.com/abstract=304050>> (giving an analysis of psychological factors used by reform-minded lawmakers to make a persuasive case for reform).

²² U. Mattei, ‘Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and Economics’, 14 *International Review of Law and Economics* (1994) pp. 3-19.

²³ D.L. Horowitz, ‘The Qur’an and the Common Law: Islamic Law Reform and the Theory of Legal Chance’, 42 *American Journal of Comparative Law* (1994) pp. 233-293.

²⁴ ECJ, Case C-212/97 *Centros Ltd v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen* [1999] ECR I-1459; Case C-208/00 *Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Co Baumanagement GmbH* [2002] ECR I-9919; Case C-167/01 *Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd* [2003] ECR I-10155.

²⁵ J.A. McCahery and E.P.M. Vermeulen, *Understanding (Un)incorporated Business Forms* (Amsterdam, ACCF 2005).

²⁶ D. Charny, ‘Competition among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law Rules: An American Perspective on the “Race to the Bottom” in the European Communities’, 32 *Harvard International Law Journal* (1991) pp. 423-456.

²⁷ For the most part, harmonised rules for legal capital tended to benefit publicly listed firms engaged in cross-border transactions. P. Leleux, ‘Corporation Law in the United States and in the E.E.C., Some Comments on the Present Situation and the Future Prospects’, 6 *Common Market Law Review* (1968) pp. 133-176.

focal point rule for legislators engaged in company law reform, the decision to eliminate the rule for private companies – in light of the ECJ’s triad of judgments on free mobility – is hardly surprising, as it could be accomplished without causing too much disturbance of existing expectations of the controlling and conservative law-making elite. In this view, the array of mandatory legal capital rules only seems to benefit several interest groups.²⁸ In fact, incumbent management may have influenced the EU legislature to supply provisions that limit dividend payments and share repurchases so as to obtain more leeway to reinvest a firm’s profits. Accountants, who play a pivotal role in the required valuation, also have a substantial interest in exerting influence on the legislative outcome.

But also members of the law-making elite, such as lawyers and other legal practitioners, seem to benefit from guiding their clients through the complicated harmonised rules.²⁹ Thus, since legal elites that benefit from the existing legal rules arguably have incentives to block innovative measures, reform-minded groups are confronted with the daunting task of replacing the existing legal rules with new measures and techniques.³⁰ Still, it is not surprising that bringing about change can be more troublesome than merely having to protect the incumbent interests. This partly explains the inherent shortcomings of this legal reform strategy.

2.1.2 *Increasing returns*

This subsection surveys another factor of path dependence that is responsible for creating barriers that hinder reform-minded lawmakers from persuading the legislature to adopt effective company law forms. This factor of path dependence, which is generally labelled as increasing returns, can explain the survival of particular institutions and traditions that were once effective in solving serious problems in the business environment but no longer provide strong support to lawmakers given changing economic and social circumstances.

It is now commonplace that if firms use a particular business form more frequently, its value increases, thereby decreasing incentives to introduce legal reform. Increasing returns engender the standardisation of rules and institutions

²⁸ W.J. Carney, ‘The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters’, 26 *Journal of Legal Studies* (1997) pp. 303-329.

²⁹ L. Enriques and J.R. Macey, ‘Creditors versus Capital Formation: The Case against the European Legal Capital Rules’, 86 *Cornell Law Review* (2001) pp. 1165-1204.

³⁰ As discussed, the blocking power of the conservative law-making elite differs from country to country. For instance, the French legislature reacted immediately to the possibility of losing new incorporations to England by reducing the minimum capital requirement to €1. On the other hand, the German legislature, as we will see, which experiences a much higher number of businesses opting for the English limited company, seems only to be able to agree on a compromise which lowers the capital requirement from €25,000 to €10,000.

over time.³¹ Standardisation, in turn, accounts for the lock-in to a suboptimal framework.³² The increasing returns approach corroborates the hypothesis that lawmakers are prone to inertia and inflexibility. The models pertaining to the appearance of increasing returns are often used to explain why the widespread adoption of products and technologies that become more valuable as their use (or the use of compatible products) increases could lead to a suboptimal outcome.³³ When increasing returns are associated with competing products, inferior products may prevail over products that are inherently better. More importantly, they may stand in the way of innovations.

The literature points to the success of the QWERTY keyboard, VHS video recorder and DOS operating system over allegedly superior alternatives.³⁴ Three related but conceptually different mechanisms are responsible for the possible dominance of increasing returns over inherent benefits: (1) sunk costs; (2) learning effects; and (3) network effects. The end result is that if new adopters of a product or technology are only interested in their own benefits without any consideration of the effect of their decision on other 'network users', the development of new products and technologies will be impeded, thereby fostering lock-in to the inferior standard.

Unsurprisingly, law and economics scholars have asserted that similar increasing return mechanisms help to explain inertia and momentum in the evolution of legal rules and institutions.³⁵ Comparable increasing return effects

³¹ M. Kahan and M. Klausner, 'Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases', 74 *Washington University Law Quarterly* (1996) pp. 347-366.

³² Bebchuk and Roe, loc. cit. n. 17 (arguing that rules might be path-dependent because the identity of the locally efficient legal rule – the rule efficient for a given country – might depend on the rules and structures that the country had at earlier times).

³³ W.B. Arthur, *Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy* (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press 1994); *ibid.*, 'Increasing Returns and the New World of Business', 72 *Harvard Business Review* (1996) pp. 100-109.

³⁴ See Arthur, *ibid.*; M.L. Katz and C. Shapiro, 'Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities', 94 *Journal of Political Economy* (1986) pp. 822-841. These allegedly superior products are, respectively, the Dvorak Simplified Keyboard (DSK), Sony's Beta format and Philips' V2000 format for VCRs and Apple's Macintosh system. But see S.J. Liebowitz and S.E. Margolis, 'Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History', 11 *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* (1995) pp. 205-226; *ibid.*, 'Network Effects and Externalities', in Newman, op. cit. n. 12, pp. 671-675 (demonstrating that the evidence for the superiority of a particular product is weak and, hence, that the extent of network effects may be much more limited than is commonly assumed).

³⁵ See M. Klausner, 'Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts', 81 *Virginia Law Review* (1995) pp. 757-852; Kahan and Klausner, loc. cit. n. 31. But see C.P. Gillette, 'Lock-in Effects in Law and Norms', 78 *Boston University Law Review* (1998) pp. 813-842; M.A. Lemley and D. McGowan, 'Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects', 86 *California Law Review* (1998) pp. 479-611; L.E. Ribstein and B.H. Kobayashi, 'Choice of Form and Network Externalities', 43 *William and Mary Law Review* (2001) pp. 79-140.

appear to play a pivotal role, especially in the field of business forms, which could be viewed as legal products traded in a market.³⁶ Consider, for example, statutory provisions and cases under company laws. In most Western jurisdictions, the majority of firms are organised under the provisions of a corporate statute. Such statutes not only confer substantial network effects to users of those statutes, but firms also expect to obtain further benefits as new enterprises incorporate. Unlike the VHS example, the use of the corporate statute could be valuable to a particular firm, regardless of whether other firms have incorporated under the same statute. All the same, widespread use of the corporate form could have network effects analogous to those of the QWERTY keyboard. As more firms adopt the corporate form, networks of legal actors specialising in this particular business form (e.g., lawyers and legal scholars) will develop, thereby offering legal services of a higher quality and at a lower cost. Furthermore, firms may choose the corporate form to attract and accommodate investors who expect firms to use it.³⁷

Learning effects further reinforce the application of increasing returns processes to business forms, including legal doctrines, statutory provisions and case law.³⁸ These effects, which come from the use of the corporate law statute, for instance, also explain why most of the parties that originally opted into the corporate form have an incentive to continue to use the regime. Factors that arguably add to the value of the traditional corporate form include avoidance of

³⁶ See R.A. Posner, 'Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution', 49 *University of Chicago Law Review* (1982) pp. 263-291; B.A. Banoff, *Company Governance Under Florida's New Limited Liability Company Act*, Florida State University College of Law Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 43 (2001), available at: <<http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=294514>> (giving an overview of the literature that uses the product metaphor).

³⁷ See Klausner, loc. cit. n. 35, at pp. 785-786 (arguing that where information asymmetries exist and signalling is costly, marketing network externalities may exist). Network effects provide a purely academic explanation for the fact that US high-tech start-ups are structured predominantly as public corporations, despite tax disadvantages. Venture capitalists would rather avail themselves of the predictable corporate form, for which many contractual mechanisms have been developed and standardised, than rely on new customised governance and organisational structures.

³⁸ See W.W. Bratton and J.A. McCahery, 'An Inquiry into the Efficiency of the Limited Liability Company: Of Theory of the Firm and Regulatory Competition', 54 *Washington and Lee Law Review* (1997) pp. 629-686. If, for instance, case law creates a legal rule that goes beyond the statute, such as enhanced fiduciary duties for close corporations, increasing returns derive directly from precedent and the doctrine of *stare decisis*. See O.A. Hathaway, 'The Path Dependence of the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System', 86 *Iowa Law Review* (2001) pp. 601-665; E. Rasmussen, 'Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game', 10 *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* (1994) pp. 63-82.; A. Stone Sweet and M. McCown, *Path Dependence, Precedent, and Judicial Power*, Paper prepared for delivery at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, California, 30 August - 2 September 2001.

formulation errors, ease in drafting relational agreements, availability of case law on the interpretation of the statute and the familiarity to legal actors.³⁹ If these benefits are taken into account, newly formed businesses are likely to migrate to the business corporation statutes that confer these benefits to the user. This will mean that demand will be higher than it otherwise might be, which in turn will lead to the supply of standardised statutory terms rather than customised ones that benefit a particular firm in a particular situation. Because standardised terms offer certainty,⁴⁰ when advising their clients about incorporation decisions, business lawyers will recommend a standardised term – even if it is suboptimal – rather than draft a customised term that could lead to a higher expected value for a client.

The result of network and learning effects is that continuous use of the dominant business form, even if it is not ideally suited to some firms, will reduce the incentives for lawmakers to innovate. As in other areas of law reform, the reluctance to diverge from the existing framework means that even if new business forms were created, parties might be unwilling to substitute the standard form for non-standard terms. In short, the benefits that accrue to a standardised regime may be sufficient to outweigh the benefits that firms could gain by shifting to a new or modernised statute. Also, because potential first users of new business forms do not have the advantage of future network benefits, such new forms may only emerge if the inherent benefits are of paramount importance.

These *switching costs*, that is to say, the costs of switching from a standardised form to a new or innovative business form, constitute yet another reason for conservative lawmakers to defend the *status quo* or only engage in patching-up reforms.⁴¹ The uncertainty about the future benefits of the introduction of new legal business forms leads to the persistence of traditional rules and governance structures and delays genuine legal innovation.⁴² Like R&D investments in high-

³⁹ Clark, loc. cit. n. 8.

⁴⁰ C.J. Goetz and R.E. Scott, 'The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions between Express and Implied Contract Terms', 73 *California Law Review* (1985) pp. 261-322.

⁴¹ Research in behavioural psychology has indicated that in general people show a natural bias towards the *status quo*, in that they have a tendency to prefer to leave things as they are. Moreover, evidence from laboratory experiments shows that people exhibit a so-called endowment effect: people often demand significantly more to give up an object than they would be willing to pay to acquire it, even when the transaction costs associated with reacquiring a similar object are very low. J. Arlen, 'The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law', 51 *Vanderbilt Law Review* (1998) pp. 1765-1788.

⁴² F. Parisi, V. Fon and N. Ghei, *The Value of Waiting in Lawmaking*, George Mason University Law and Economics Working Paper Series No. 01-16 (2001), available at: <<http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=267719>>. See DTI (Department of Trade and Industry), *The UK Consultation Document from the Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy, The Strategic Framework* (1999) pp. 64-65 (arguing that in light of the opposition from special interests, professional advisers and network externalities, introducing a new statute is of no value unless it will be widely used).

tech products and technologies, initial law-making costs are partially sunk costs. In this respect, legal intervention is costly, not only due to the research, legislative and publication costs of new law but also because various legal actors must invest substantial amounts in human capital and modes of operation that *fit* the new rules and institutions. If the new legal regime proves to be undesirable over time, these costs cannot easily be recovered.


2.1.3 GmbH reform: an example of 'patching-up' provisions

In the context of company law, the ingredients of strong path dependence may involve externalities that lock firms into an inferior business form and make it very difficult for the reform-minded to convince the controlling elite of the merits of offering a new menu of legal business forms. To explain this, let us look at the current reform situation in Germany to see how resilient these mechanisms have been in facing off challenges to reforms that might have allowed firms more organisational choice. For example, despite competitive and interest group pressures to reform the German close corporation, the *GmbH*, along the lines of the British *Ltd*, German legislators have largely resisted taking actions that would challenge the *status quo*. To be sure, proposals have been advanced to reform the *GmbH* in order to stem the flow of German firms using the British limited company. Figure 2 shows that, in the first eight months of 2005, 23,496 new *GmbHs* were formed against 3,195 *Ltds*, which account for 14 per cent of the newly incorporated firms in Germany.⁴³

Nevertheless, economic and political pressures have not built up sufficiently to force through German legislative action that would involve substantial costs to incumbent groups. For example, it has been proposed that changes involving the reduction of minimum capital requirement (involving a reduction from €25,000 to €1), the transplant of the British *wrongful trading rule*⁴⁴ and the option allowing

⁴³ Despite more stringent disclosure requirements, German businesses have benefited greatly from the adoption of the UK limited company. The inherent benefits of the business statute (speedy registration, low formation costs and no minimum capital requirement) outweigh the enhanced disclosure responsibilities, such as filing annual reports to Companies House in the United Kingdom. Traditionally, small German firms would prefer to pay small fines than disclose their accounts to local business authorities. To be sure, many German limited companies are confronted with a large fine and possible dissolution due to failure to submit punctually to Companies House their financials. However, the strict UK requirements are unlikely to discourage German firms from continuing in high numbers to register in the United Kingdom. Hugh Williamson, 'Germany's Love of the Limited', *Financial Times*, 4 October 2006.

⁴⁴ The *wrongful trading regulation* requires directors to monitor the firm's health and, if necessary, take some remedial or preventive measures that prevent their firms from sliding into insolvency.

Figure 2: Comparison of newly incorporated *GmbHs* versus *Ltds*

Source: Adapted from Deutscher Bundestag (BT) – Drucksache 16/283 – 16.12.2005 – *Auswirkungen und Probleme der Private Limited Companies in Deutschland*.

firms to choose a single layer member-managed *GmbH* would lead to a more flexible and lower-cost structure, thereby overcoming the path dependence forces which have successfully blocked the introduction of a more market friendly structure so far.⁴⁵ The German legislature had a two-phased reform in mind. First, a compromise proposal should have lowered the capital requirement from €25,000 to €10,000. Subsequently, a more fundamental reform should have further adjusted the *GmbH* legislation to the social and economic changes. However, due to the change in government after the federal election in September 2005, the proposed reform path has not seen the light of day. The point here is that not only have reform groups failed to overcome the system's barriers, but they have also failed to effectively alter society's perceptions about the need for legislative change in this field. Major reforms that involve deviations from the current rules on the preservation of the share capital and the notarial deed requirement for the transfer of the shares are unlikely to find support in the near future. However, in order to limit the increasing popularity of the limited company, a new proposal to introduce a modernised *GmbH* was published on 29 May 2006.⁴⁶ The proposed act – *Gesetzes zur Modernisierung des GmbH-Rechts und zur Bekämpfung von Missbräuchen (MoMiG)* is built on four main functions of the *GmbH* law: (1) The incorporation of a *GmbH* should be fast, cheap and

⁴⁵ To be sure, the German legislature introduced a professional limited liability partnership (*Partnerschaftsgesellschaft*) in 1995 and updated the legislation in 1998. However, the procedures involving the formation and operation of this partnership form appear too costly and cumbersome to economic actors. For instance, the *Partnerschaftsgesellschaft* statute is linked awkwardly to both the civil and commercial partnership rules.

⁴⁶ See <<http://tinyurl.com/yv2wnn>>.

simple; (2) the new *GmbH* should offer a transparent shareholder structure; (3) creditors should be better protected against illicit exploitation and rent-seeking strategies of the owners of a *GmbH*; and (4) the move away from the real seat approach to the adoption of the incorporation theory.

The reform measures serve to simplify the registration system, making a fast and electronic registration with the chamber of commerce possible for *GmbHs*. The availability of a public shareholders' list at the chamber of commerce emphasises the importance of the electronic registration as such an up-to-date list should help prevent the acquisition of the company from non-shareholders. It is the intention of the new Act to consider only registered persons as shareholders. In order to make the *GmbH* an attractive export product, the new Act proposes to abolish the requirement that the registered office of a firm is located in the same country as its corporate seat. Surprisingly, however, the upgraded *GmbH* would still require a minimum capital of €10,000 (see Table 1). Moreover, as a trade-off for the reduction of the minimum capital requirement, the legislature proposes to increase the managing director's liability in the event of the firm's insolvency as a consequence of, for instance, the repayment of shareholder loans leading to

Table 1: Legal characteristics of the 'new' *GmbH* (Germany)

Characteristic	<i>GmbH</i> (revised)
Legal personality	Yes
Management	At least one managing director.
Formation	Articles of incorporation + notarial deed + registration at the registry of commerce + audit by the local court + publication in a legal gazette.
Autonomy of articles of incorporation	Some provisions are only valid if they are included in the articles. Agreements and resolutions with effect for the future or that lack the agreement of all shareholders are null and void or voidable.
Notarisation of articles of incorporation	The articles must be recorded in a notarial deed, otherwise they are null and void.
Fiduciary duties	Statutory shareholder's right to information/case law duty of good faith and loyalty.
Financial rights	Shareholders have a right to share profits in proportion to their investment.
Transferable interests	No public offerings allowed; a transfer of shares requires a notarial deed in order for the transfer to be valid.
Continuity of life	Yes
Limited liability	Yes, minimum capital requirement of €10,000.
Financial statements	Mandatory disclosure
Taxation	Corporate taxation
Linkage	Management structure of public corporation (<i>Aktiengesellschaft</i>).

illiquidity of the company. In fact it is intended that insolvency legislation will solely regulate shareholder loans made by lenders holding at least 10 per cent of the shares. Under the new provisions, loans advanced by shareholders will be treated as debt rather than liable equity capital.

It seems that Germany's law-making elite is motivated to secure the popularity of the *GmbH* by enacting a compromise legislation that focuses mainly on the relations of shareholders and managers to persons dealing with the *GmbH*. By shifting creditor protection from company law to insolvency legislation, lawmakers seek to extend protective measures to foreign business forms that fall within Germany's bankruptcy regime.

The above example shows that the legislative inertia resulting from both elite and traditional rule-making, as well as from the standardisation effect, arguably leads to strong-form path dependence in Germany, which hampers innovation despite serious competitive pressures from the English limited company. The next section, however, will discuss how competitive pressures could instigate reforms despite the presence of considerable path dependence effects. It seems that the influence of high-powered, reform-minded interest groups is pivotal to the direction of change in company law reform.

2.2 The second strategy: responding to reform-minded interest group pressures

The evolution of company law may well generate a new transformation if national lawmakers find a compelling reason to abandon the defence of well-entrenched legal forms and increasing returns that reinforce their position and block the diffusion of new innovative legal rules and institutions. Studies on the political determinants of legislative change have examined the connection between public welfare and legislative outcomes, calling into question the motivation of lawmakers to undertake reforms on this basis. Given this, the introduction of new company law forms in response to social and economic concerns would seem unlikely. Nevertheless, the recent emergence of new business forms strongly suggests the presence of some kind of incentive to innovate.

A general implication for a broad theory of legal evolution is that lawmakers do not always dominate the law-making process. This is especially true of company law, which is influenced not only by lawmakers, but also by politicians and – more importantly – interest groups.⁴⁷ To fully explore this phenomenon, this section discusses the incentives for the introduction of new legal forms. This analysis builds on the economic theory of legislation, which assumes that legal

⁴⁷ See G.S. Becker, 'A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence', 98 *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (1983) pp. 371-400; G.M. Grossman and E. Helpman, *Interest Group and Trade Policy* (Princeton, Princeton University Press 2002).

rules are demanded and supplied in much the same way as other products. Legislation ensues from the jointly maximising relationship between interest groups and political actors. Promising political or personal support,⁴⁸ interest groups persuade political members of the legislature, and specifically those who run the supply and demand process of legal products, to pass or veto legislation.⁴⁹

A key question concerns the identification of the groups of firms that are able to lobby successfully for business organisation law reform and the prospect of success. Within the economic theory of legislation, legislatures have no incentive to adopt efficient provisions for firms that lack sufficient resources to lobby for laws.⁵⁰ Generally, the legislature, consisting of risk-averse politicians and conservative lawmakers, tries to avoid innovations. Yet if powerful interest groups demanded that provisions of business forms be changed, political pressures within the legislature would attempt to satisfy the demand with beneficial legislation.⁵¹

In terms of assessing the likelihood of the enactment of modernised or new business forms into national law, there are several classes of firms that might be directly attracted by the cost-saving benefits. The first class is made up of prospective firms that will only come into existence if modern, flexible and responsive business vehicles are available. For instance, it is expected that simplicity and low formation costs will not only appeal to firms but will also encourage the formation of joint ventures and other combinations. The second class consists of future start-ups which would use either the traditional partnership or close corporation form. For the most part, these start-ups are small, closely held firms that would not consider the law *ex ante* but may unwittingly fall foul of unexpected and disruptive rules *ex post*. The third class is made up of potential portfolio firms that will convert into the newer business form in order to have a chance of attracting outside capital. A fourth and related class consists of existing

⁴⁸ Interest groups have several means of influencing the so-called *brokers* of legislation. For instance, they can offer hoped-for future employment. Another pervasive means is political support, i.e., monetary contributions to political campaigns and votes. In addition, personal relationships make members of the legislature particularly responsive to interest groups. See Laffont and Tirole, op. cit. n. 2; R.E. McCormick and R.D. Tollison, *Politicians, Legislation, and the Economy, An Inquiry into the Interest-Group Theory of Government* (Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishing 1981). Because politicians care about their re-election, they seek information on how their position on a particular issue will affect the outcome of the next election. As a result, it is submitted that 'lobbying and information provision by interest groups to politicians is the most important factor in explaining governmental policy outcomes'. J.M. De Figueiredo, *Lobbying and Information in Politics*, Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper No. 369 (2002), available at: <<http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=318969>>.

⁴⁹ R.D. Tollison, 'Public Choice and Legislation', 74 *Virginia Law Review* (1988) pp. 339-371.

⁵⁰ M. McCubbins and T. Schwartz, 'Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms', 28 *American Journal of Political Science* (1984) pp. 165-179.

⁵¹ W.W. Bratton and J.A. McCahery, 'Regulatory Competition, Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation', 73 *North Carolina Law Review* (1995) pp. 1861-1947.

firms for which cost savings will accrue in the event of reorganisation to a new business form, with the savings exceeding the cost of reorganisation. This class includes professional service firms which, but for a limited liability partnership form, would continue to use a traditional partnership form.

A wide array of business firms may deviate from the *status quo* to demand a new company law form. Economic evidence shows that only certain firms will have sufficient influence to achieve positive legislative results, either because they are more powerful than others or because they perform collective lobbying through a common body which gives them an advantage over other firms in the procurement of favourable legislation.⁵² Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), for instance, are not likely to play a featured role in the development of business organisation legislation. While this type of firm could derive much benefit from legal changes that dispose of the cumbersome formation and operation requirements, information and organisation costs arguably inhibit its efficacy in attaining its preferred legislative goals.⁵³ In the event of SMEs making the lobbying effort independently, they must first incur information costs in discovering the effects of the choice of business forms on their own welfare.⁵⁴ Consequently, since SMEs may be severely budget-constrained in their ability to influence the legislature,⁵⁵ they have incentives to join up with firms with which they share common interests so as to lobby for legislation. The organisation costs (i.e., the costs of identifying other similarly situated firms) must not exceed the overall benefits from lobbying. This is especially true if firms encounter collective action problems. Rational firms have incentives to free-ride on the costly lobbying efforts of others. Attempts to engage in collective lobbying will therefore fail if a few firms bear the entire cost but receive only a portion of the benefits.⁵⁶ Additionally, even if small and medium-sized firms can overcome these problems and have adequate resources to lobby legislatures, they are likely to expend their efforts on more pressing operational and special considerations relating to a particular industry.

It can therefore be predicted that company laws will not adequately reflect the needs of SMEs. But even if this class of firms has high-powered incentives to lobby for innovative business forms,⁵⁷ their efforts might not be successful. In

⁵² J.R. Macey, 'Public Choice and the Law', in Newman, op. cit. n. 12, Vol. 3, pp. 171-177.

⁵³ McCormick and Tollison, op. cit. n. 48.

⁵⁴ As small firms are unlikely to consider business organisation laws, except in major relational crises, it is costly to ascertain the effects of different rules and provisions in advance.

⁵⁵ J.M. De Figueiredo and E.H. Tiller, 'The Structure and Conduct of Corporate Lobbying: How Firms Lobby the Federal Communication Commission', 10 *Journal of Economics & Management Strategy* (2001) pp. 91-122.

⁵⁶ M. Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press 1965).

⁵⁷ A.E. Bernardo and I. Welch, *On the Evolution of Overconfidence and Entrepreneurs*, Yale International Center for Finance Working Paper No. 00-48 and Yale Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1307 (2001), available at: <<http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=275516>>

terms of assessing the prospect of success, two factors may play a crucial role. First, legislative procedures and political processes reduce the stakes interest groups have in regulation. Legislatures have developed administrative structures and mechanisms (i.e., the political and regulatory institutions, voting rules and rules of order) to control the opportunistic conduct of politicians and legislators who are sensitive to lobbying.⁵⁸ As a result, the supply side plays a decisive role with respect to company law reform.⁵⁹ Second, although amendments to the menu of business forms would arguably make smaller firms more efficient, it may not be in the interests of other more powerful lobby groups to modify the law to allow new legal forms to emerge. Consequently, legislatures are likely to respond by failing to adopt value-increasing legislation.

Consider, for instance, notaries (lawyers who specialise in incorporations and are qualified to issue a notarial deed), who could organise themselves as a significant interest group, blocking innovative measures and frustrating attempts to effectively implement the easy availability of limited liability for small businesses.⁶⁰ In continental Europe, a notarial deed is usually required for all incorporations (see also Table 1). Given the importance that firms attach to the regulation and cost of market entry,⁶¹ the extension of limited liability protection to partnership forms would preferably not require the issuance of such a deed. Yet, if a limited liability partnership were to gain adherence amongst investors and popularity with entrepreneurs,⁶² the notaries' fee revenues might drop substantially. If their losses are more

(arguing that overconfident entrepreneurs are relatively less likely to imitate their peers and more likely to explore the environment leading them to adopting new innovations).

⁵⁸ M.D. McCubbins, R.G. Noll and B.R. Weingast, 'Structures and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies', 75 *Virginia Law Review* (1989) pp. 431-482. A. Schwartz and R.E. Scott, 'The Political Economy of Private Legislatures', 143 *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* (1995) pp. 595-654.

⁵⁹ Laffont and Tirole, op. cit. n. 2.

⁶⁰ It might be argued that the persistence of the system of notaries is an example of the path dependence role of interest groups as a serious source of path dependence. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the function of notaries was to register long-term contracts, including relational contracts, such as partnerships. Apparently, the merchants used notaries when 'reputation via word of mouth alone was insufficient to support honest behaviour and that a third party without any binding authority to enforce obligations was nonetheless quite valuable for promoting honest exchange'. P.R. Milgrom, D.C. North and B.R. Weingast, 'The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs', 2 *Economics and Politics* (1990) pp. 1-23. In continental European jurisdictions, the formal use of lawyers as notaries evolved into a requirement to obtain legal personality.

⁶¹ S. Djankov, R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer, *The Regulation of Entry*, Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 1904 (2002), available at: <<http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=283839>>.

⁶² It is submitted that the developments with respect to the 'quasi-partnership' close corporation demonstrate the demand for business forms that combine partnership and corporate features. L.E. Ribstein, 'Statutory Forms for Closely Held Firms: Theories and Evidence from LLCs', 73 *Washington University Law Quarterly* (1995) pp. 369-432.

acute than the possible gains of business lawyers who would be involved in the formation process of a new limited liability vehicle, the notaries will have a particularly high-powered incentive to block such a new form.

That is not to say that legal professionals will not lobby for modernised company law legislation. Indeed, the US experience points in the opposite direction. In the previous section, we explored how differences in legal business forms may persist across jurisdictions, and offered some predictions on the evolution of new legal forms. In interpreting the process by which business forms have evolved so far, we sought to identify the parties that help to set the agenda for the reform of company law and which considerations have been instrumental in stimulating the recent instigation of new company law reform strategies that set in motion the shift away from the extant partnership and corporate forms as a business vehicle for closely held firms.

This effect is most obvious in the United States, where the relatively simple landscape of company law has changed dramatically over the last two decades. For instance, the LLP emerged in Texas in 1991 to provide ‘peace of mind’ insurance for innocent partners. Thereafter, the LLP spread rapidly from two States in 1992 to all 50 States and the District of Columbia by 2001. The LLC is yet another, and more successful, legal production that combines partnership features with corporate characteristics. The introduction of the LLC bundled together limited liability, a flexible governance structure and preferential tax treatment and also require less ongoing paperwork than corporations. Also, it provides an almost total shield against personal liability without cumbersome formation and capital maintenance rules. In 1977, the first modern LLC statute was promulgated in Wyoming at the behest of lawyers and accountants acting as a lobby group for an oil company wishing to combine limited liability and pass-through tax treatment.⁶³ The emergence of and subsequent experimentation with the LLC forced the tax authorities to explain in more detail the distinction between partnership and corporate tax treatment, which eventually led to a new federal ‘check-the-box’ tax rule. Under the IRS ‘check-the-box’ regulations, which became effective on 1 January 1997, ‘unincorporated’ associations are taxed as partnerships unless they affirmatively elect to be taxed as corporations.⁶⁴

⁶³ In 1975, lawyers and accountants advising Hamilton Brothers Oil Company devised the ‘limited liability company’, resembling the Panamanian *limitadas*. After a failed legislative effort in Alaska, they lobbied successfully for enactment of the LLC statute in Wyoming. In 1980 only, the IRS issued a favourable private letter ruling to Hamilton Brothers Oil Company regarding its Wyoming LLC structure. See R.W. Hamilton, ‘Professional Partnerships in the United States’, 26 *Journal of Corporation Law* (2001) pp. 1045-1060.

⁶⁴ The partnership taxation – pass-through tax treatment – is based on the assumption that a partnership is a mere aggregate of individual partners who redistribute profits among themselves. Consequently, LLC income is treated as if it were personal income realised by the members, and is taxed to the members as individuals. In contrast, corporate income is taxed first to the corporation and later, if it is distributed as dividend, to the shareholders individually.

The ‘check-the-box’ regulations triggered yet a third wave of amendments of the LLC statutes, thereby encouraging the adoption of a wide variety of LLC statutes. Table 2 compares the LLP – as regulated in RUPA (Revised Uniform Partnership Act) – and the LLC – as it appears in the Uniform Limited Company Act and the Delaware Limited Liability Act. This comparison shows that the Delaware LLC evolved in the direction of a corporate-type LLC with narrow fiduciary duties and restrictive exit clauses.

It appears that legal professionals, as experts in law with a well-entrenched position and proximity to the law-making process, have a strong ability to influence the legislature.⁶⁵ As noted, the increase in recent years of the number of hybrid entities offering limited liability can be attributed to the legislatures’ responsiveness to the interest group activities of professional services actors. Well-organised professional firms may lack enough choice to shield their liability, giving them adequate incentives to exercise political influence over legislatures to enact an LLP-type form.⁶⁶ In addition, innovative legal professionals who seek to design and implement new arrangements for their clients may have a financial incentive to persuade the legislature to enact a new business form.⁶⁷ If the existing menu of business forms does not satisfy a pent-up demand for firms to employ new and improved frameworks,⁶⁸ *innovative form entrepreneurs* will endeavour to capture the market, thereby increasing their fee revenues.⁶⁹ In the event of these professionals strongly favouring reform, given both types of incentives, the legislature is likely to respond by referring back to, and evolving from, existing doctrines and rules. For instance, they will bear in mind the key role of notaries in the formation and operation of business forms. In fact, the current role of notaries in business formations makes it likely that they will be able to defend the *status quo* or expand their power in the future.

⁶⁵ L.E. Ribstein, *Lawyer Licensing and State Law Efficiency*, Working Paper (draft of March 2002).

⁶⁶ The professional lobbies could be very powerful if they are in fact the by-products of organisations that obtain their strength and support because they perform some functions in addition to lobbying for collective goods. Because membership is in fact mandatory, the organisation can overcome information, organisation and collective action problems. See Olson, *op. cit.* n. 56.

⁶⁷ The role of business lawyers as interest groups is of course closely related to their role as lawmakers in the arena of legal formants.

⁶⁸ Since there is a prevailing view that tax issues play a crucial role in choice of business form decisions, innovative lawyers are inclined to design statutes or combinations of statutes with a view to helping firms obtain favourable tax treatment. Section 4 of this paper shows that there are other choice of business form drivers, such as contractual flexibility and the autonomy of firm participants in structuring, free from court interference, the internal affairs of the firm. See D.A. Oesterle, ‘Subcurrents in LLC Statutes: Limiting the Discretion of State Courts to Restructure the Internal Affairs of Small Business’, 66 *University of Colorado Law Review* (1995) pp. 881-920.

⁶⁹ See Banoff, *op. cit.* n. 36.

Table 2: Comparison of US LLP and US LLC

Characteristic	LLP (RUPA)	LLC (ULLCA)	LLC (Delaware LLC)
Legal personality	Yes	Yes	Yes
Management	Decentralised	Decentralised (default) Centralised (opt-in)	Decentralised (unless otherwise provided in the LLC agreement, the management is vested in LLC members in proportion to the then current percentage or other interest of members in the profits).
Formation	Informal by two or more partners.	Public filing of the articles of organisation with the Secretary of State (one or more members).	In order to form an LLC, one or more authorised persons must execute a certificate of formation, which must be filed in the office of the Secretary of State.
Autonomy of articles of organisation	Partnership: relationship governed by written and oral agreements.	If operating agreement is inconsistent with the articles of organisation: (1) the operating agreement controls the internal affairs; (2) the articles control as to third parties who reasonably rely on the articles (the articles must set forth only limited and specific information, such as the name of the company and the address of the initial designated office).	It is the policy to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company agreements.

Characteristic	LLP (RUPA)	LLC (ULLCA)	LLC (Delaware LLC)
Notarisation of articles of incorporation	No	No	No
Fiduciary duties	Duties of loyalty and care. Obligation of good faith and fair dealing.	Duties of loyalty and care. Obligation of good faith and fair dealing.	Access to information and records.
Financial rights	Equal sharing (default rules).	If no agreement, sharing in proportion to the members' contribution to capital.	If no agreement, profits and losses will be allocated on the basis of the agreed value of the contributions.
Transferable interests	Generally, no.	Yes, restrictions are imposed by the Act, securities laws and operating agreement.	Yes, restrictions are imposed by the Act, securities laws and operating agreement.
Continuity of life	Withdrawal does not automatically dissolve the LLP.	Withdrawal does not automatically dissolve the LLC.	Possibility to resign from an LLC is limited; resignation does not automatically dissolve the LLC.
Limited liability	Yes	Yes	Yes
Financial statements	No need to disclose records publicly; partners have access to records.	Members have access to records. No mandatory disclosure.	Members have access to records. No mandatory disclosure.
Taxation	Pass-through ('check-the-box')	Pass-through ('check-the-box')	Pass-through ('check-the-box')
Linkage	Linked to general partnership form.	Some provisions are similar to RUPA.	De-linked

The upshot is that the political economy of new company law statutes tends to reflect the compromise between the legislature and powerful organisations of professional lawyers. It is by no means certain that a new framework that meets the perceived interests of professionals is efficient and equally beneficial to other business firms, SMEs in particular. Nevertheless, legislatures are likely to allow these other firms to use such a framework without the value of corresponding advantages for these firms.

To illustrate these points, let us consider the introduction of the LLP in the United Kingdom. While the decision to introduce an LLP was motivated by diverse factors, including election politics, which contributed to its speedy passage, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) was directly involved in the establishment of the LLP. The DTI, which was motivated by the threat of regulatory competition from offshore LLP statutes, particularly that of Jersey,⁷⁰ promulgated the Limited Liability Partnership Act in 2001.⁷¹ The legislation introduced a new limited liability vehicle that has legal personality, a partnership governance structure and partnership tax treatment.⁷² In drafting this legislation, the DTI responded to the pent-up demand from multinational professional service firms wishing to transfer to LLP status.⁷³ Importantly, the reform-minded law-making elite, side-stepping traditional elites, exploited the lobby groups' pressures to extend the scope of the UK LLP to other non-professional firms. In this view, the linkage of the UK LLP to the corporate law provisions, such as the requirement to comply with many of the provisions of the Companies Act and Insolvency Act, constituted a trade-off for gaining access to limited liability. Equally, conservative lawmakers made it mandatory that accounts must be audited to show a 'true and fair' view under UK GAAP.⁷⁴ The Consultative Committee of Accountancy Bodies has published a Statement of Recommended Practice (SORP) on accounting by Limited Liability Partnerships (LLPs).⁷⁵ SORP

⁷⁰ Limited Liability (Jersey) Law, 1996. Motivated by liability and tax considerations, British accountants (in particular Ernst & Young and Price Waterhouse) provided a wholly crafted statute to the Jersey legislature, a largely passive and accessible body that decided to enact the statute. In speedily adopting the LLP, Jersey signalled its commitment to a comprehensive set of business forms for foreign organisations. However, high switching costs and doubts about the prospective benefits of incorporating as a Jersey LLP may explain Jersey's failure to capture a share of the UK partnership market.

⁷¹ The Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000, the Limited Liability Partnerships Regulations 2001, and the Limited Liability Partnerships (Fees) (No. 2) Regulations 2001 came into force on 6 April 2001.

⁷² The Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 and the Finance Act 2001 provide that LLPs are classified as partnerships for tax purposes.

⁷³ In its draft Regulatory Impact Assessment, the DTI made a 'tentative estimate' that around 60,000 regulated firms might eventually become LLPs.

⁷⁴ There are exemptions from audit for LLPs with turnover up to a certain threshold. On 26 May 2000, this threshold was set at an amount of £1 million.

⁷⁵ See SORP, *Accounting by Limited Liability Partnerships*, available at: <<http://www.ccab.org.uk>>.

confirms that UK LLPs must disclose their financial statements in line with those of limited companies.⁷⁶ Table 3 gives an overview of the most important legal features of the UK LLP.

Table 3: Legal characteristics of UK LLP

Characteristic	UK LLP
Legal personality	Yes
Management	Decentralised; in absence of agreement every partner may take part in management, however designated members have particular responsibility for certain statutory requirements.
Formation	Registration at Companies House on a prescribed form LLP2 together with a statutory fee – two or more partners.
Autonomy of articles of incorporation	LLP agreement
Notarisation of articles of incorporation	No
Fiduciary duties	No general duty of good faith; specific duties in the regulations to account for competing activities and use of partnership property.
Financial rights	In absence of agreement, equal sharing rights.
Transferable interests	No public offerings allowed.
Continuity of life	Change in membership of partners does not lead to dissolution.
Limited liability	Yes
Financial statements	An annual return and annual statutory accounts must be filed.
Taxation	Pass-through taxation
Linkage	Linked to corporate law provisions.

⁷⁶ Initially, there was significant resistance to the UK Government mandating financial disclosure for LLPs. Many commentators assumed that the high cost of disclosure and privacy issues would limit the interest in the LLP. The Limited Liability Partnerships Regulations and accounting standards require that the financial statements should include, unless exempted by the requirements of the Companies Act 1985 as modified by the Regulations, the following items: (1) profit and loss statement, consolidated in the case of a group preparing accounts; (2) a statement of total recognised gains and losses pursuant to FRS 3, consolidated in the case of a group preparing accounts; (3) cash flow statement pursuant to FRS 1, consolidated in the case of a group preparing accounts; (4) a balance sheet, and a consolidated balance sheet in the case of a group preparing accounts; and (5) notes to the financial statements disclosed.

It follows that innovative change differs across systems, depending on the organisation of reform-minded interest groups and the accessibility and responsiveness of legislative bodies. In fact, these features help explain the capacity of the US and UK legal systems to establish hybrid legal vehicles for different forms of business relationships and professional firms. The next section suggests that legal evolution is also not immune to exogenous shocks, such as social and economic changes, international competition and foreign pressures, which may be sufficient to trigger new company law statutes.

2.3 The third strategy: responding to exogenous pressures

In this section, we discuss how existing institutional arrangements may be called into question by economic shocks, increasing global competition or war.⁷⁷ The large-scale effects of these events can lead to reversals of expectations and consequently supply incentives and opportunities for reform-minded groups to create new legal rules and institutions. Even though there are few genuine exogenous shocks in history, it is generally recognised that the Asian economies experienced a major financial crisis in 1997, which, combined with earlier underlying weaknesses, prompted policymakers to consider altering the taken-for-granted institutional arrangements. A most conspicuous example of external shock induced organisational changes is formed by the corporate governance and securities law reforms in Japan, which were introduced by governmental regulators in response to the so-called lost decade of the 1990s.

Japan has a long history of responding to external threats. Consider, for example, the period before the Meiji reforms, when Japan was essentially a closed country and carried out only limited commercial and cultural exchanges with the Hollanders.⁷⁸ At the end of the Edo period (1603-1867), the Japanese Government responded to the external shock of confronting new social and economic pressures of the Russians, and later the Europeans and Americans, which attempted to establish trade contracts with Japan. Yet, it was only in 1854 that Japan ratified the Japan-US Treaty of Peace and Amity forced by Commodore Perry of the US Navy. But, it took some time for the trade, which remained very limited until the beginning of the Meiji period (1868-1912), to develop. Foreign nations demanded the ratification of treaties, which provided for immunity for foreigners from Japan's existing penal system. At the same time, these treaties granted foreign traders economic and legal advantages over domestic business people. In order to regain independence and dignity in their own country, Japan reacted, among other

⁷⁷ See M.J. Roe, *Legal Origins and Modern Stock Markets*, ECGI Working Paper (2006), available at: <<http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=908972>>; R.G. Rajan and L. Zingales, *The Great Reversal* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press 2003).

⁷⁸ The Meiji period (1868-1912) is known for bringing about the modernisation of Japanese economic, political and social institutions.

things, by adopting legal reforms, including a legislative regime to govern the internal affairs of companies, inspired by German law. The transplantation of a civilised, Western-style legal system was viewed as the only rapid and effective solution to force the foreign powers to abrogate the treaties.

Thus, company law in Japan could be viewed as a German transplant.⁷⁹ Despite the 1950 amendments introduced during the American occupation, the general corporate form (*Kabushiki Kaisha*) remained relatively formal and later reforms continued to show a tendency to transplant German legal rules.⁸⁰ For instance, the enactment of the *Yugen Kaisha*, a closely held business form based on the German *GmbH* in 1938, reflects the German legacy.

Subsequently, radical attempts to change Japan's company law system emerged in the late 1990s. In general, this period is considered to be a 'lost decade' as Japan experienced a long-lasting severe recession following the burst of the preceding bubble economy. The Japanese economy was hit hard as large corporations defaulted and banks suffered under an increasing weight of non-performing loans. The 'shock' not only hit the financial economy but also destroyed Japan's self-esteem as a 'technopower'. The weakening of domestic confidence, manifested in the involvement of the Japanese bullet train, *Shinkansen* – once a symbol of the reliability of Japan's technological superiority – in multiple accidents in 2000, has become increasingly important for Japan. Moreover, large firm confidence was further weakened by the successful commercial strategies of European and American high-tech companies, collaborating through US hybrid entities, that have eroded the position of many Japanese technology-oriented firms.

All of this raised concerns about the rigidities and shortcomings of Japanese law. The growing emphasis on institutional reform and change, in response to globalisation and the corresponding competitive pressures, has been stimulated by a new constellation of interest groups that have significant political clout to bring about a variety of reforms, including the facilitating of stock options, to spur the knowledge-based sector and encourage investment.

Besides traditional governance measures, policymakers have focused on creating hybrid business forms, similar to those developed earlier in the United States and United Kingdom, that offer more flexibility in the decision-making structure and governance framework, as well as in the resource management mechanisms needed to support the efforts of firms working in the human capital intensive sector. Moreover, there are numerous indications that policymakers have devoted considerable attention to the concerns of the largest and most established companies seeking to develop new technology and spin-off new

⁷⁹ See C.J. Milhaupt, 'In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in Japan', 105 *Columbia Law Review* (2005) p. 2171.

⁸⁰ Such as strengthening the statutory auditors' powers.

opportunities and intellectual property, which can form the basis of joint ventures and alliances.⁸¹ Thus, by 2003, the Ministry of Justice had established a number of priorities involving the amendment of the Commercial Code. The end result was a package of legislative reform measures, comprised in the New Company Law, which were submitted to the Diet in March 2005.

Generally, the New Company Law (*Kaisha Ho*) abolishes the *Yugen Kaisha* (YK), the close corporation, and leaves a modernised *Kabushiki Kaisha* (KK) in place (grandfathering the existing YKs). The KK regulation is liberalised through the relaxation of the minimum capital requirements (reducing the required ¥10 million to net assets of ¥3 million). Further, closely held KKs, which restrict in their articles of association the free transferability of shares, will only require one director to be appointed instead of three. The appointment of a statutory auditor for the KK is not mandated if an officer is appointed who has the qualifications of tax accountant or accountant. While a suitably modernised KK will surely attract a number of closely held firms, the legislature acknowledged that the amendments introduced will not be sufficiently attractive to those individuals or established companies that are interested in selecting a more flexible business form.

It is therefore not surprising that the New Company Law provides for the introduction of a new company law form, the Limited Liability Company (LLC) or *Godo Kaisha*. The LLC is a partnership-type form that bundles together limited liability, decentralised management by default, unanimous consent to transferability of members' interests, fiduciary duties and no requirement to audit and disclose financial records. The Japanese vehicle bears a strong resemblance to the US LLC (e.g., voting and distribution rights are proportionate to the members' contributions) but diverges in a number of important respects, including: (1) contributions to the LLC will be limited to cash or property, but no services, know-how or other agreements are permitted; and (2) the LLC will receive corporate, but not pass-through, tax treatment.

It may be that the adoption of a US-style LLC can be seen as the effect of a strong triggering event, which is the determinative force of domestic institutional change. It is difficult at this juncture, however, to be certain that these changes are only the result of such an exogenous trigger. Moreover, it is hard to distinguish between endogenous and exogenous pressures as the determinative force of

⁸¹ In 2002, realising this adverse change in the competitive situation, Japan used its prior and existing Research Association for Mining and Manufacturing Technology Law (*Koukou-gyo Gijutsu Kenkyuu Kumiai Hou*) and established 'EUVA' (EUV association, 2002-2008) aiming at catching up to the EUV-LLC, but so far this effort has not born fruit. To worsen the situation, the US-European group has just initiated their stage by starting the INVENT partnership (2005-2012) to which IBM, AMD, Infineon and Micron Technology have contributed roughly ¥70 billion (about US\$700 million) which is also a closely held firm aimed at carrying out similar R&D activities (similar to EUV-LLC) on technologies to form a super-fine semiconductor integrated circuit by using extreme ultra violet (EUV) light.

institutional change. In any event, it could be argued that the sequence of institutional changes marked by the new hybrid entities is ultimately the result of both pressures. On the one hand, the effects of decreasing returns on key actors within a commercial system, notably through the growth and internationalisation of the financial system and the integration of product markets as a whole, actually influences the course of legal and institutional development, undermining complementary institutions and policies. Further, pronounced disruptions to the existing path not only intrinsically altered the interests of key pressure groups but also modified their incentives to invest in the development of new types of legal institutions and rules. That said, the scope for both exogenous and endogenous pressures to bring about major structural reforms in Japan is evidently great.

On the other hand, controlling legal elites and incumbent interest groups were initially strongly resistant, regardless of the pressures, to the adoption of a business form that combines important attributes of the corporate form and the partnership form, such as limited liability, flexibility and pass-through taxation. In order to overcome resistance to change, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) stepped in and submitted, subsequent to the introduction of the *Godo Kaisha*, the Limited Liability Partnership Bill to the Diet in February 2005. As a consequence, the LLP or *Yugen Sekinin Jigyō Kumiai* came into effect on 1 August 2005 to encourage the creation of new business ventures, joint ventures and other strategic partnerships between high-tech companies and research institutions. The LLP Law provides for the introduction of a vehicle that is characterised by limited liability, a flexible organisation structure, pass-through taxation and restrictions on the free transferability of partners' interests. Despite these attractive features, the legislation mandates a number of highly restrictive and costly features including: (1) registration of the LLP agreement; (2) disclosure of financial information including the profit and loss statements and the balance sheet upon the request of creditors; (3) the mandatory obligation of partners to participate in LLP management and its operation; and (4) the right of partners to exit at will. Notwithstanding these arguable shortcomings, which reflect political compromises, the LLP may, as will be discussed in the next section, provide significant cost advantages to firms.

Viewed from the perspective of an entrepreneurial government faced with exogenous pressures, such as global competition,⁸² rapid changes in technologies and evolving market conditions, it is more likely to promote the competitiveness of indigenous industries through adoption of a cost-effective, reliable and flexible legal regime. If the future brings a substantial increase in business activity, a shift in interest group pressures for efficiency-based law-making could well be expected. Such a jurisdiction may consider entering the competitive law-making environment for the supply of law as a product. In the company law context, a jurisdiction could

⁸² Bratton and McCahery, loc. cit. n. 38.

reap the benefits by coming forward with a set of contractual-based rules ideally suited to closely held firms. If this jurisdiction would engage in a law reform process along such lines, it could very well create a focal point leading to a significant number of domestic and even foreign firms selecting this legal innovation.

Singapore is an example of an entrepreneurial jurisdiction. As a result of increased competition in Asia and the rapid development of China and the increase of Chinese firms being engaged in cross-border activities, the Singapore legislature enacted, among other things, an LLP (which came into effect on 11 April 2005). This evolution reflects ‘the acute awareness of the need to recognise and accommodate current international business and commercial practices’.⁸³ The Singapore LLP (S-LLP) is a new type of business vehicle in Singapore based on the Delaware LLP and to a lesser extent on the UK LLP. An S-LLP is a legal entity that can sue and be sued and acquire and hold property. Like its Japanese counterpart, it offers a flexible management structure and pass-through taxation. The S-LLP is a stand-alone business form explicitly de-linked from the existing partnership law.⁸⁴ The partners are not personally liable for the firm’s debts and obligations.⁸⁵ This protection shall not impact the personal liability of a partner in tort for his own wrongful act or omission. The internal relationship between the partners is governed by the limited liability partnership agreement. In the absence of an agreement or when the agreement is silent, the First Schedule, which acts as a model agreement, will apply. Although the S-LLP is required to keep accounts and other records, it is not necessary to prepare profit and loss accounts or balance sheets or to have them audited and disclosed. Table 4 provides a comparative overview of the revised and introduced business forms in Japan and Singapore.

The transformation described above provides a framework to evaluate the economic role of new hybrid business forms. On this basis, the next section will evaluate the new legal entities that emerged in the United States, the United Kingdom and Asia and are attracting more and more businesses to their relatively new network. It is suggested that these hybrid business forms, compared to the traditional menu, can provide effective choices for controlling opportunism while limiting transaction costs. Three fundamental questions will be asked: (1) whether closely held firms would prefer to select a new, redesigned hybrid legal entity, which sets forth the joint ownership structure and provides important contractual provisions in advance; (2) whether new business forms ideally suited to particular businesses are better positioned to offset the inefficiencies resulting from the lock-in effects and path dependence factors; and (3) how many products a menu of legal business forms should contain.

⁸³ See <<http://www.singaporelaw.sg>>.

⁸⁴ See Section 6 of the Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2005.

⁸⁵ The LLP may recover distributions from partners that know or ought to have known that the LLP was insolvent or the distributions caused insolvency of the LLP.

Table 4: Comparison of new company law in Japan and Singapore

Characteristic	KK (new)	J-LLC	J-LLP	S-Private Company	S-LLP
Legal personality	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Management	Corporate structure (shareholders-board of directors).	Flexible – no restriction.	Flexible – mandatory participation of all partners.	Corporate structure (shareholders-board of directors).	Flexible – default: partnership like management structure.
Formation	Registration of the articles of incorporation with the Legal Affairs Bureau (<i>hōmukyōku</i>) – registration fee = ¥150,000.	Formed by articles of incorporation signed between members – registration of operating agreement and corporate seal with the Legal Affairs Bureau (<i>hōmukyōku</i>) – registration fee = ¥60,000.	Registration and disclosure of the LLP agreement with the Legal Affairs Bureau (<i>hōmukyōku</i>) – registration fee = ¥60,000.	Registration of the memorandum (subscribed by at least one person) and the articles of association.	Online registration at <http://www.bizfile.gov.sg>. Registration costs S\$165 and takes 15 minutes.
Autonomy of articles of incorporation	Yes	Operating agreement	LLP agreement	Yes	LLP agreement
Notarisation of articles of incorporation	Yes – notarisation fee = ¥50,000.	No	No	No	No

Characteristic	KK (new)	J-LLC	J-LLP	S-Private Company	S-LLP
Fiduciary duties	Directors must act in good faith.	Managers have similar duties to legal duties of KK directors.	Defined by LLP agreement (incomplete law).	Duties of directors: (1) to act honestly; (2) duty to disclose shareholdings; (3) duty to convene general meetings.	Defined in LLP agreement or, if the agreement is silent, the provisions in the First Schedule (full disclosure of relevant information and non-compete clause).
Financial rights	Distribution of profits and losses allocated according to equity participation ratio (however, distributions of profits require net assets of at least ¥3 million).	Profits and losses may be allocated at a different rate from the equity participation rate if specified in operating agreement.	Profits and losses may be freely allocated with the unanimous approval of partners.	Dividends shall be apportioned and paid proportionately to the amounts paid or credited as paid on the shares during any portion or portions of the period in respect of which the dividend is paid.	Defined in LLP agreement or, if the agreement is silent, the provisions in the First Schedule (equal sharing rule).
Transferable interests	Shares are freely transferable. Restrictions (by making transfer subject to board approval) in the articles are possible.	Members' unanimous approval required.	Partners' unanimous approval required (mandatory rule).	A private company restricts the right to transfer its shares.	LLP agreement – default: assignment of financial rights.

Characteristic	KK (new)	J-LLC	J-LLP	S-Private Company	S-LLP
Continuity of life	Yes	Yes, even with one member.	Yes, but minimum of two partners.	Yes	Yes, the Court may order the winding up if the LLP carries on business with less than two partners for more than two years.
Limited liability	Yes, no minimum capital requirement, but in practice some paid-in capital is necessary.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes (claw-back provision for distributions made three years before insolvency).
Financial statements	Disclosure of annual balance sheet.	No disclosure of annual balance sheet – financial statements must be made available to members and creditors.	LLP must disclose its balance sheet and profit and loss statement to creditors (upon request).	Submission of an audited profit and loss account and balance sheet at a general meeting.	Accounts and other records should be kept and retained for seven years. No mandatory audit and disclosure requirements.
Taxation	Corporate	Corporate	Pass-through	Corporate	Pass-through
Linkage	Company law	Company law	Law concerning limited liability partnership agreements.	Companies Act	Non-applicability of partnership law clause.

Source: Adapted from <<http://www.singaporelaw.sg>> and <<http://www.jetto.go.jp>>.

3. NEW PRODUCT SELECTION

3.1 The rise of 'new company law' products

The three reform strategies roughly lead to the emergence of three distinct statutory products. First, a legal upgrade arguably provides an easy to use vehicle that supplies lawyers and firms with familiar provisions that are 'tried and tested' and consequently offer learning and network benefits to users of the form. Second, a linked – but new – legal business form similarly holds out continued network and learning benefits along with the prospect of superior cost advantages due to better suited statutory provisions. Third, in contrast, a non-networked product holds out greater costs for adopting firms, as switching costs effect prospective users negatively, and the absence of an established set of precedents, which are needed to fill the gaps in the inherently incomplete law, provide few incentives for parties to adopt an entirely new type of legal product.


It would not be surprising, given the relative cost advantages of upgrading, that the first approach is the obvious alternative. A modified statute could be attractive as there are no new learning costs involved. Because there are usually few alterations needed, it is easier for practitioners and business parties to adjust to the new round of changes. Given that the changes are unlikely to touch the core components of the legal tradition and its legitimating features, parties will have an incentive to learn the new rules. Nevertheless, the upgrade model has been criticised for not only making innocuous, albeit necessary, changes but for being out of step with innovative social and economic change. Although the upgrade approach seems attractive, particularly if the existing statutory framework is functionally obsolete, it is unlikely to benefit users unless accompanied by genuine cost-saving changes.

Despite the apparent ease for jurisdictions to engage in producing statutory upgrades, this phenomenon has proved more costly and time-consuming than anticipated. This is evidenced by: (1) the difficulty in the design of acceptable upgrades; and (2) the reluctance of lawmakers to agree and quickly implement the proposed changes. Apparently, lawmakers when committed to incremental reform are less concerned with the pace and practical consequences of legislative change.

Even though most jurisdictions still employ the upgrade strategy to reform, an increasing number of countries embrace a new product approach by following either the second or third reform strategies as described in the previous section. This can be seen in the cases of the United Kingdom, Japan and Singapore, which moved quickly into uncharted territory when embarking on a new legal reform strategy that complemented their existing upgrade legislative reform approach. Surprisingly, this development seems better able to ensure speedy and effective legislative action. The length of time to develop and reform new company statutes is reflected in Figure 3.

It follows from Figure 3 that it is probably easier for lawmakers to understand and appreciate the alleged benefits of the new forms across political systems. The complex tax and doctrinal issues that can hamper and delay law reform projects are more effectively avoided when a new vehicle is proposed which leaves untouched the existing company law framework. Reforms along these lines, moreover, are supported by interests groups due to the measurable benefits they yield, including a new business form's (1) greater flexibility; (2) response to specific market problems and pressures; (3) ability to resolve conflicts between agents; and (4) value-added features in the structuring of transactions and business planning. Thus seen, the introduction of new legal products results in inherent benefits for businesses leading to major changes in the bargaining environment in which firms operate.

Figure 3: The time needed to introduce the LLP




3.2 Inherent benefits of new statutory products

3.2.1 Limited liability and pass-through taxation

New statutory products often involve an optimal mix of legal and fiscal attributes.⁸⁶ Empirical research supports the view that a new legal product eventually outweighs the benefits that arise due to learning and network effects.⁸⁷ While there is great appeal to the utilisation of existing frameworks, firms are now more inclined to structure their business in a framework that is largely free from legal oversight and allows experimentation. Figure 4 shows the number of LLP formations in the United Kingdom for the 2001-2005 period.

Figure 4: Total number of LLPs in the United Kingdom




Source: Companies House (20,000 LLPs in March 2006 is an estimated figure).

⁸⁶ See R.B. Thompson, 'The Taming of Limited Liability Companies', 66 *University of Colorado Law Review* (1995) pp. 921-946.

⁸⁷ See Ribstein and Kobayashi, loc. cit. n. 35.


Figures 5 and 6 below show, respectively, the categories of businesses that have adopted the S-LLP and J-LLP.

Figure 5: LLPs in Singapore



Source: BizFile Singapore.

Figure 6: LLPs in Japan



Source: BizFile Singapore.

Rather than the professional firms for which the LLP form was initially designed, there are numerous other categories of businesses which, due to a variety of drivers, have selected this new form. There are a number of common factors that induce firms to choose hybrid forms (e.g., limited liability and tax advantages). Limited liability is the most important attractor of businesses to the hybrid entities. Surprisingly, empirical research shows that, despite tax benefits, the emergence of the LLC did not affect the total number of new incorporations. It appears that the first LLC statutes were not able to attract firms that typically incorporated.⁸⁸ Observers questioned, for example, why high-tech start-up firms chose to forgo tax savings by selecting the public corporation.

Naturally, it is difficult to give a clear-cut answer, as the factors prompting start-ups to prefer the corporate legal form to other vehicles is the subject of considerable controversy. Commentators have argued that the network effects and conversion costs, rather than the pass-through tax treatment and its lower tax rate, are the main considerations for selecting the corporate form.⁸⁹ The reluctance on the part of venture capital backed start-ups to choose the LLC is explained in terms of a preference to save on transaction costs and time in the course of the venture capital cycle. By forming a public corporation, for instance, they would avoid the costs of converting the LLC into the corporate form before an initial public offering (IPO).⁹⁰ Indeed, conversion to a corporation remains necessary as long as underwriters in the United States are loath to support hybrid business forms that issue equity interests.⁹¹ To be sure, it is only to be expected that the popularity of the US LLC will increase when it becomes a more accepted instrument for initial public offerings. Even though the US LLC allows for publicly traded 'units' – that are nothing more than depository receipts for the owners' property interest – the efficiency of selling units is called into question because underwriters are probably unwilling to employ 'units' on a large scale.

Nevertheless, the popularity of the LLC in the fastest growing business segment of the market in the United States is increasing. Approximately 30 per cent of the 100 fastest growing firms in the United States are structured as LLCs. These companies are less than five years old, but their annual sales exceed US\$1 million.⁹² This trend is to some extent driven by the recent tendency of venture

⁸⁸ Ribstein and Kobayashi, loc. cit. n. 35.


⁸⁹ J. Bankman, 'The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-ups', 41 *UCLA Law Review* (1994) pp. 1737-1768; Klausner, loc. cit. n. 35.

⁹⁰ Although the laws regarding the conversion of LLCs to corporations are usually very flexible in the United States, such a conversion could nevertheless, depending on the number of investors, be surrounded by cumbersome barriers in terms of finances and resources.

⁹¹ See Bankman, loc. cit. n. 89, at pp. 1749-1750. Issuing interests to the public dissipates the tax advantage because most publicly traded business forms are taxed as corporations under section 7704 of the Internal Revenue Code.

⁹² See <<http://www.entrepreneur.com/hot100>>. These 100 firms had total sales of US\$1.7 billion in 2005 and employed a total number of 6,920 people.

Figure 7: Tax-driven business planning



Source: Adapted from Blashek and McLean (2006).

capital and private equity funds, faced with ever-growing fierce and global competition, to embrace complex structures that help optimise the financial results for each group of investors. Figure 7 above shows, for instance, how the pass-through feature of the LLC, in combination with a corporate blocker, could increase the options for fund managers to better tailor the tax structure to the needs of their investors.

Certainly, there is some evidence that similar flow-through vehicles, such as the Canadian Business Income Trust, Energy Trust and Real Estate Investment Trust, are associated with tangible tax benefits that attract a significant number of firms (see Table 5).⁹³

Table 5: Comparison of the taxes paid under different structures

	Corporate structure	Income trust	Limited partnership
Entity level	\$35.00	NIL	N/A
Investor level:			
Taxable Canadian	\$5.70	\$14.82	\$14.82
Non-resident	\$2.15	\$3.30	\$8.36
Tax-exempt	N/A	N/A	N/A
Total tax	\$42.85	\$18.12	\$23.28

Source: Department of Finance, Canada (2005).

While the Canadian vehicles, for example, can be employed more widely than in other jurisdiction, their enhanced popularity, compared to similar vehicles in the United States, seems mainly related to the fact that an IPO does not effect their tax treatment.⁹⁴ In contrast, US listed entities are by definition taxed as a corporation. A similar pattern would likely emerge if the US tax authorities were to adopt the same fiscal measures. Such a development would naturally tip the balance in favour of the LLC, since the possible benefits of incorporation, like network effects, would not weigh up against the advantages of hybrid forms.


There is already a trend which shows a high number of firms selecting the LLC over the corporate form in the United States. The decrease in new incorpora-

⁹³ Department of Finance Canada, *Tax and Other Issues Related to Publicly Listed Flow-Through Entities (Income Trusts and Limited Partnerships)*, Consultation Paper.

⁹⁴ The popularity of the Canadian Trust is evidenced by 255 trusts currently listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. However, the income tax structure raised concerns for lawmakers faced with the imminent prospect of declining tax revenue. Recently, the Canadian Finance Minister responded by subjecting existing trusts to the same rate of taxation as corporations. The trusts will have a four-year transition period to adjust to the new regulations, see B. Simon, 'Corporate Canada Takes a Deep Breath', *Financial Times*, 5 November 2006.


tions is not only attributed to tax advantages but also to the flexibility surrounding the formation and operation of an LLC as well as the higher costs associated with satisfying corporate governance mandates arising from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.⁹⁵ Figure 8 shows that the number of new corporations in the United States declined while the LLC continues to gain in popularity.

Figure 8: New filings of corporations and LLCs in the United States



Source: 2006 IACA Annual Report of Jurisdictions.

Figure 9: New business formation in Delaware (2003-2005)



Source: 2005 Annual Report, Delaware Department of State, Division of Corporations.

⁹⁵ See L.E. Ribstein, 'Why Corporations?', 1 *Berkeley Business Law Journal* (2004) p. 183.

3.2.2 Limited liability and private ordering

It is a common refrain in the evolution of the corporate form that firms, in exchange for certain privileges, go through a number of formalities to incorporate their businesses, varying from, at first, the governmental approval of a corporate charter to the obligation to abide by the terms and provisions of the corporate statute, particularly the rules surrounding the separation of ownership and control. Before the Industrial Revolution, the privileges consisted mostly of a monopoly over trade or the exclusive right to act on behalf of the government in developing a country's infrastructure. With the growth of commercial and industrial activity, the pressures from politically influential industrialists to abandon the specific governmental approval of a corporate charter grew steadily. By 1890, the statutes providing for incorporation by simple registration prevailed throughout the United States. The introduction of a relatively simple incorporation procedure in France in 1867 had already resulted in the rapid proliferation of general incorporation statutes in continental Europe.

In its developed form with fully-fledged limited liability protection, the corporation was the business form of choice for large-scale firms which were compelled to amass substantial sums of equity capital in order to give effect to capital-intensive industrial and technological innovations. The principle of limited liability was widely acclaimed as an industrial breakthrough and it took only until the late nineteenth century for the corporate limited liability feature to become available to smaller, closely held firms. In this respect, two legal developments could be distinguished. First, a separate close corporation form, the *Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH)*, was enacted in Germany in 1892. Another, second, development demonstrates the importance of case law in furnishing smaller firms with the much-coveted limited liability feature. A decision of the House of Lords in *Solomon v. Solomon & Co. Ltd* overturned the assumption that only passive investors were granted limited liability under the Companies Act of 1862. These developments gained widespread popularity across jurisdictions.⁹⁶ To date, most countries recognise a form of close corporation which, although increasingly flexible in terms of permissible deviations from the statutory provisions, are still modelled on the public corporation and its capital-oriented management structure.⁹⁷

This raises the question whether corporate-type business forms, without the pass-through tax treatment (as discussed in the previous section) but with the partnership-type feature to devise the most efficient management and governance

⁹⁶ See McCahery and Vermeulen, loc. cit. n. 25.

⁹⁷ See M. Lutter, 'Limited Liability Companies and Private Companies', in D. Vagts, ed., *Business and Private Organizations, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law*, Vol. XIII (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 1998) chapter 2.

structure, would gain a foothold in the modern business environment. The answer to this question can be found in France. Recent data concerning the use of the French *société par actions simplifiée* (SAS), a limited liability vehicle that is considered to be the most flexible company form in France, which allows parties to freely contract into an optimal decision-making arrangement, indicates that the main driver for business form selection is not only tax but also contractual flexibility.⁹⁸

Table 6 shows the eschewal of tax as the driver for hybrid forms. Clearly, this runs against commentators' expectations that tax considerations predominately explain entity selection.⁹⁹ Obviously, the driving force behind SAS is the freedom of contract which enables firms, in an incomplete contracting world, to adapt to changing market circumstances and increased global competition.

That said, the key driver behind the success of the new hybrid business forms, such as the LLPs and LLCs, is the concept of maximum flexibility and autonomy of firm participants to structure the firm's internal affairs free from legal principles and doctrine.¹⁰⁰ It seems that, even though economic and path dependence factors prevent the emergence of complete law, the extended private ordering principles enhance the ability of business parties to experiment with these new forms. Businesses in need of debt and equity capital cannot therefore be expected to be tied up with corporate or partnership forms that only offer costly and burdensome statutory measures, such as mandatory management and decision-making structures (in the case of corporations) or broad fiduciary duties (in the case of partnerships). This is especially true if these business forms – explicitly – fail to allow for the possibility to waive or contract around statutory rules and standards. For instance, the fact that parties may be subject to broad fiduciary duties, which may require a party to forgo personal interests, appears to act as a deterrent to venture capitalists and joint venturers. If parties are allowed to bring an action based on a breach of fiduciary duty when their high-risk gamble does not pay off, thereby circumventing the contractual mechanisms put in place to overcome information problems, the transaction costs arising from legal uncertainty and statutory ambiguity will increase significantly.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ The SAS gained popularity at a rapid rate in recent years. In 2000, there were only 4,500 SASs and 225,000 SAs. In 2003, the number of SASs took a big leap to approximately 100,000 registrations. The number of SAs declined to 160,000 (<<http://www.lentreprise.com/dossier/6.485.html>>).

⁹⁹ See Ribstein, loc. cit. n. 62.

¹⁰⁰ Oesterle, loc. cit. n. 68.

¹⁰¹ See S.W. Stevenson, 'The Venture Capital Solution to the Problem of Close Corporation Shareholder Fiduciary Duties', 51 *Duke Law Journal* (2001) pp. 1139-1178.

Table 6: Comparison of French business forms

	Société anonyme (SA)	Société à responsabilité limitée (SARL)	Soiété par actions simplifiée (SAS)	Most advantageous
Minimum capital	€37,000	No	€37,000	SARL
Minimum number of shareholders	7	1	1	SARL - SAS
Management structure	3-18 board members (mandatory) – the president must be an individual person.	One or more managing directors who must not be corporate entities.	Flexible – at least one president.	SAS
Tax	Corporate	Corporate	Corporate	SA - SARL - SAS
Transfer of shares	Free transferability	Restricted	Free, but articles may restrict.	SAS
Limited liability	Yes	Yes	Yes	SA - SARL - SAS
Accountant	Mandatory	Exempted below a certain threshold.	Mandatory	SARL

Source: *L'Entreprise* No. 222 (April 2004).

To be sure, a new hybrid business form has the potential drawback of being a relatively untested entity that has not yet generated a large body of case law and academic research. The fact that company law is inherently incomplete and the parties are boundedly rational inevitably necessitates the involvement of the judiciary in the resolution of intra-firm disputes.¹⁰² Indeed, it might be argued that new legal products only survive because the judiciary plays an important role in *ex post* dispute resolution and the development of legal precedent. Judges and arbitrators could, for instance, offer a solution to a puzzling and disturbing gap in the corporate contract, such as an easy buyout right for the dissatisfied partner, if the incomplete contract makes the minority vulnerable to opportunistic exploitation by the majority.¹⁰³ Empirical research indicates that new business forms create a new network of cases dealing with, among other things, the nature of new business forms, formation requirements, fiduciary duties, limited liability and veil piercing, transfer of interests and dissolution.¹⁰⁴

However, judicial gap-filling is not only costly and time-consuming but may also be prone to error. Judicial intervention can create a potential judicial wild card that creates costly uncertainty.¹⁰⁵ It is submitted that while intra-firm controversies are often observable to the exasperated parties, they may not be easily verified by a judge or arbitrator, and even less so when personal relationships in the family or between friends are involved.¹⁰⁶ As a consequence, many analysts think the judicial role should be limited, in the case of contractual incompleteness, to the selective enforcement of contracts according to their written terms. Given the spur for new company law products that offer the maximum contractual flexibility, courts should ‘permit persons or entities to join together in an environment of private ordering’.¹⁰⁷ In order to enhance legal certainty, courts should thus first respect the contractual arrangements. Only if both the statute and agreement are silent should courts endeavour to fill the contractual gap by looking at the parties’ intentions *ex ante*.

¹⁰² Bratton and McCahery, loc. cit. n. 51.

¹⁰³ See Oesterle, loc. cit. n. 68.

¹⁰⁴ E.S. Miller, ‘The Emerging LLC and LLP Case Law: A Survey of Cases Dealing with Registered Limited Liability Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies’, *ABA Partnerships and LLCs – Important Case Law Developments* (Chicago, ABA 2003).

¹⁰⁵ P.G. Mahoney, *Trust and Opportunism in Close Corporations*, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper No. 6819 (1998), available at: <<http://ssrn.com/abstract=141142>>.

¹⁰⁶ T.A. O’Neill, ‘Reasonable Expectations in Families, Businesses, and Family Businesses: A Comment on Rollock’, 73 *Indiana Law Journal* (1998) p. 589 at p. 591 (illustrating the artificiality of the family/market dichotomy with a US case, *United States v. Chestman*, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), in which the Second Circuit surprisingly ruled that marriage creates a confidential business relationship).

¹⁰⁷ See *Elf Atochem North America, Inc. v. Jaffari*, 727 A.2d 286 (Del. 1999).

That is not to say that greater contractual flexibility will automatically lead to efficiency. An efficiency-minded legislature has the task to develop improved statutory default rules when enhanced certainty and guidance are needed. In order to increase the success of new business forms, legislators are advised not only to keep the statute up to date but also to ensure it meets the coveted social and economic requirements over time. For instance, if the mandatory participation provision in the Japanese LLP entails problems for the internal stability of firms, the legislature may eventually offer new rules that are clearer and give better guidance on dealing with agency problems in a business environment. In this context it is worth noting that Delaware's legislature strives to maintain legislative pre-eminence by periodically amending, among other things, the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act. Table 7 highlights the amendments to the Act in 2003, 2004 and 2005.

Table 7: Amendments to the Delaware LLC Act (2004-2006)

	2004	2005	2006
Number of sections in the amendment	15	18	38
Amendment:			
Freedom of contract	7	-	-
Clarification of default rules	3	10	6
Domestication/conversion	4	6	26
Effective date of the amendment	1	1	1
Other amendments	-	1	5

Source: General Assembly of the State of Delaware.

The above table shows that Delaware frequently updates the LLC Act to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the clarification of default rules. We should point out that interest group pressures mandate the introduction of amendments facilitating the domestication of and conversion to Delaware law. If we take this point a step further, it is not difficult to explain the importance of the clarification of the default rules. Since the selection of business forms is a choice made *ex ante*, interest groups (e.g., business lawyers) have an interest to inform the legislature of shortcomings in existing provisions and provide technical support in devising amendments.

As we have seen, the freedom of contract is a priority of Delaware lawmakers, and in this respect it could be argued that amending the LLC statute into an all-purpose 'contractual entity' is necessary to confront the technological advances and the internationalisation of the economy. There is something to the introduction of a 'contractual entity' that can be tailored to the business needs and

expectations of each type of firm. Parties in joint ventures, for instance, are likely to reduce agency problems and contract into the preferred structure of their particular relationship even if business form statutes do not contain any default rules. Still, the function of statutory company law – as a standard form contract – must not be underestimated. In the context of non-listed firms, company law should first offer a relatively small group of unsophisticated – and often unmotivated – business parties a ready-made business contract. Second, company law should give statutory guidance to mostly larger firms that do not fare well when ownership and control are integrated.

Table 7 reflects Delaware's concern about emphasising the importance of offering a coherent and consistent set of provisions. By continuously updating its legislation, Delaware signals to investors and creditors what they can expect in terms of the internal decision-making process and external representation model of a company. The foregoing discussion suggests that, given the importance of statutory guidance and the two types of governance structure (integrated and differentiated), a menu of business forms should contain at least two closely held limited liability entities, a manager-managed entity and a member-managed business form. As we have seen, this 'new company law' development is likely to occur more rapidly and with higher quality results, as the legislatures of more and more jurisdictions are realising the importance of the role of hybrid business forms in transaction planning and structuring.

4. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have distinguished three different positions along the reform strategy spectrum of company law. The first position is located on the left side of the spectrum and closest to stasis – where virtually no effective legal changes can occur and where the mere idea of reform clashes with legal tradition and standardisation pressures. An example of a jurisdiction that takes this position is Germany. Along or near the mid-point of the spectrum, we see that company law changes are less impeded by tradition and standardisation factors but are influenced more by interest group pressures. We see England occupying this position. Japan can be seen as a more adaptable jurisdiction located towards the right end of the spectrum and is therefore better able to create and introduce more functional legal rules and institutions that turn the traditional view of company law around. It is submitted that Singapore is located on the right side of the spectrum, as its legislature is aware of the need to adapt the legal system to international business practices in order to develop a distinct jurisprudence, acclaimed for its efficiency and integrity, which is set apart from the English legal system.

As we have seen in the case of company law reform, the influence of traditional law-making elites on the reform process often leads to legal products that are out of step with the dominant vectors of economic and cultural change in

society. Interest group and exogenous pressures can open up opportunities for reform-minded lawmakers previously blocked in their efforts to undertake legislative reforms. This does not imply, however, that reform-minded legislators will create first-best measures that satisfy the demands of users. Yet, despite certain inefficiencies identified in this paper, there are some inherent benefits for firms in employing the new hybrid business forms. Besides pass-through taxation, the hybrid vehicles offer parties the freedom to contractually establish the rights and obligations within the organisational structure. They combine the corporate feature of fully-fledged limited liability with the partnership law principles of flexibility and informality. In this respect, the 'new company law' ushers in a new era in which the statement 'when in doubt, don't incorporate' is increasingly applicable to, in particular, innovative businesses. The introduction and popularity of 'new company law' in some jurisdictions, as depicted in this paper, is already a significant step in that direction.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.